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ABSTRACT
The events surrounding the Deepwater Horizon disaster have changed the face of
deepwater operations. In order to continue drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the regulatory body,
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), has required that applications to
conduct work in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) include a plan to stop, capture, or contain any
uncontrolled release of fluids. The capping and containment systems built and implemented by
BP during the event are an excellent starting point for minimizing pollution from deepwater
subsea blowouts, but the system has limitations. The industry recognizes these limits but is
currently focused on meeting the regulatory requirements.
This project will analyze events reported to the BSEE in the past 15 years to define the
basis for potential capabilities that a capping and containment system should have to minimize
the volume of fluid released as well as minimize the time needed to regain control of the well.
The analysis will take a detailed look at 90 events over the past 15 years to determine critical
factors in the design of a generally applicable capping stack. The research will also look at
specific barriers that were used to regain control of the well. Finally, any factors which
contributed to the severity of the event or contributed to the success of the blowout response are
identified. Based on this detailed review, a list of design considerations for a generally
applicable capping stack was created.

viii
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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
In April 2010, the industry and the world were reminded once again that although the
technology surrounding drilling continues to improve and become safer, blowouts still happen.
As Figure 1-1 shows, blowouts have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico every year dating back to at
least 1975.

Figure 1-1: All Gulf of Mexico Blowouts (1975-2010)

The annual number of blowouts over the past 35 years has remained within a fairly
narrow range (2-10 events). Additionally, the annual number of blowouts during drilling
generally follows the drilling activity level as shown in Figure 1-2.
While it is true that the number of events follows the activity level in a general way,
1

when the number of blowouts per foot of well drilled for deepwater and shallow water is
examined, an interesting trend emerges (Figure 1-3).

Figure 1-2: Drilling blowouts vs. wells spud in the past 35 years

Figure 1-3 makes the distinction between deepwater and shallow water events. In order
to make sense of the graph, we need a definition of deepwater. For this research, the definition
of deepwater will be greater than 1,000 ft. This is the current industry and federal regulatory
body’s (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement) standard definition (LaBelle and
Lane 2001; International Association of Drilling Contractors 2002, 136). While this is not a
perfect definition for our research due to the fact that we are focusing on subsea intervention and
therefore are not focusing on bottom founded rigs and platforms, the number of incidents
involving floating structures and rigs is too small to be statistically relevant. This is because
there are fewer floating structures in the Gulf of Mexico than bottom founded structures.
2

Therefore, the decision was made to examine all events in all water depths and to consider those
in more than 1,000 ft. as deepwater regardless of the type of platform or rig.
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Figure 1-3: Drilling blowouts per million feet drilled per year (deepwater and
shallow water events)

Figure 1-3 shows that the number of blowouts per foot of well drilled have been fairly
constant for both deepwater and shallow water events for the past 15 years. However, there is a
disturbing trend in deepwater blowouts for the past two years. This trend has not gone on long
enough to determine if this is statistically significant or not, but it does point out that while
shallow water events have remained fairly constant or even dropped in recent years, the trend in
deepwater is different. This tells us that focusing on the deepwater as a source for future
blowouts is a valid concern.
Blowouts occur on a fairly regular basis, but they rarely cause catastrophic consequences.
However when they do, the cost can be very high. In May 2010, the six highest cost spills
3

(Table 1-1) were (DuBois 2010), the Deepwater Horizon (Macondo) blowout, the Exxon Valdez
tanker spill, the Amoco Cadiz tanker spill, the Ixtoc blowout, the Kuwait oil field blowouts
during the first Gulf War and the Aegean Captain/Atlantic Empress tanker spill. The total 2010
US dollar impact for all these spills was $51.14 billion dollars.
Table 1-1: Top Six Oil Spills by Cost
Name of Event
Deepwater Horizon/Macondo
Exxon Valdez
Amoco Cadiz
Ixtoc
Gulf War (Kuwait Oil Fields)
Aegean Captain/Atlantic Empress

Cost (2010 US Dollars)
$40 billion#
$6.3 billion
$3.0 billion
$1.3 billion
$540 million
Unknown

Amount of Oil Spilled (bbl)
4,900,000*
284,900
1,679,800
3,552,000
11,100,000
2,123,800

*Approximated (McNutt et al. 2011), # (Skoloff and Wardell 2010)

The $40 billion is an estimated cost for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo (Macondo)
event. The data comes from Huffington Post in late 2010. This does not include punitive
damages assessed by the government and only represents what the company has set aside in an
escrow fund for the spill. The cost for the Gulf War spill is remarkably low because the Kuwait
government was only willing to pay for high priority areas, so many of the areas did not have
any clean up. The cost for the Aegean & Atlantic tanker collision is unknown as the collision
occurred off the coast of Tobago, and much of the product burned or evaporated immediately
after the collision. It should be noted that of the top six events only two events are as a result of
a blowout. Three of the four events are transportation events. And the final event can be
classified as an act of war or terrorism.
The costs of the Ixtoc and Macondo blowouts exemplify why industry should continue to
focus on driving the number of blowouts down. It is notable that the value of all the active rigs
and platforms in the Gulf of Mexico was estimated by Risk Management Solutions, one of the
leading catastrophe modeling companies, at $70 billion dollars. The value of the wells
4

themselves is another $150 billion dollars (Risk Management Solutions 2009). Macondo is one
event, and the cost of that event is more than half the value of all the active rigs and platforms in
the Gulf of Mexico in 2009. This demonstrates the extreme cost of catastrophic blowouts and
makes the argument that preventing future catastrophic blowouts should remain a priority for
everyone in the oil and gas industry.

1.2 Regulatory Response to Macondo
The capping stack solution to the Macondo event is a wonderful example of a creative
engineering design solution. The capping stack is an approach that is often used in response to
land-based blowouts, but one had never been attempted in a deepwater environment. The fact
that the solution was successful is a testament to the people who engineered the capping stack.
The capping stack was almost immediately incorporated into the BSEE regulations.
The current regulatory requirements state that an oil spill response plan should be
included with all new applications to drill or workover wells in federally regulated waters. This
response plan should illustrate how the operator will respond to a spill with actual contracts and
specific equipment to contain the “worst case discharge”. Part of this response plan is therefore
required to detail the capping and containment capabilities of the response equipment.
This requirement led to the formation of two independent containment companies. The
concept behind these companies is nearly 300 years old. It is similar to the 1700’s private fire
brigades. These fire brigades would collect fees from commercial properties, and in the event of
fire, these fire fighting companies would respond and extinguish the fire. The property owner
had peace of mind knowing that a dedicated fire brigade would respond in the event of a fire at
their building (Baker 1970; Anderson 1979). The two containment companies are Marine Well
Containment Company and Helix Well Containment Company. Both companies have members
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who have bought into the company and will help pay for the maintenance of the equipment so it
will be available for their use when needed. Additionally, the member companies have
additional rights when contracting the services of the equipment in the event of a blowout. The
well containment companies are essential for operators to obtain permits for drilling in the Gulf
of Mexico.
During the plenary session at a recent deepwater drilling technical symposium a panel of
individuals representing Chevron, Shell, Marine Well Containment Company, Helix and the US
Coast Guard stated that the people within the oil and gas industry they have talked with
recognize the limitations of the capping stack solution as created by BP, however a detailed
evaluation to determine what capabilities would be desirable in the subsea capping stack is
beyond the current industry focus (Achee et al. 2011).

1.3 Objectives
1.3.1 Capping Stack Project Objectives
This research is being conducted as part of the “Functional Design and Sizing for Subsea
Capping System” project funded by the Gulf Research Initiative (GRI). The overall goal of the
project is to provide the answers to the following questions:
1. What are the minimum, mandatory capabilities for a generally applicable, quick
response, subsea capping stack?
2. What supplementary capabilities should be provided by additional modules to
achieve the functions likely to be necessary for an effective subsea capping,
containment and intervention system?
3. What are the required sizes, pressure ratings, and geometries for these
components?
6

1.3.2 Research Objectives
The specific and primary goal of the research presented in this thesis is an investigation of
blowout incident records over the past 15 years in the Gulf of Mexico to help define the
operational requirements for an effective capping stack system. The specific objectives relating
to determining the capabilities of the subsea capping stack include an examination of past events
to:
1. Identify shallow water events and identify what differences would exist assuming
an equivalent event occurred in deepwater.
2. Identify and categorize methods used to control and stop the release.
3. Identify any critical factors which could have contributed to a release of greater
magnitude.
4. Identify containment methods used in these events and which were most effective
in minimizing pollution.
5. Identify all release points
6. Identify and categorize leak flow paths to determine the effectiveness of using a
capping stack
7.

Identify the relevance of having a well intervention capability built into the capping
system.

Meeting these goals and objectives should provide a basis for response systems to be
designed to minimize the time needed to regain control of the well and minimize the volume of
hydrocarbons released. Regaining control of the well would include reestablishing two barriers
in the well. These barriers can be either mechanical barriers or hydrostatic barriers.
A secondary goal is to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on
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offshore blowouts for use in future research on improving the understanding of, responses to, and
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills.
The use of past events to successfully describe future events requires a huge assumption.
It requires that past events be likely predictors of future events. There are several circumstances
where this assumption is invalid, however, for this work, two have relevance. First, the
assumption is valid only if technology has not changed significantly. For instance, the incident
at Spindletop in Texas in 1901 and others like it would not be good predictors of future
deepwater Gulf of Mexico events.
Additionally, the assumption is only valid as long as significant regulatory changes have
not occurred. In the late 1970’s, well control training became mandated offshore for the first
time. Prior to the late 1970’s, no well control training was required for personnel working
offshore. That did not mean that no offshore personnel had well control training, but there was
no mandatory requirement for it. This was a significant change in regulations. Incidents from
prior to this time cannot be compared to incidents after that time as the changes in the regulatory
environment are too great. Because of the changes in technology in the past 20 years as well as
regulatory changes since the 1970’s, only events in the past 15 years were examined.
Currently, we are in the midst of another significant regulatory change. The Drilling
Safety Rule which became effective on October 14, 2010 significantly changes the regulatory
environment. The purpose of this new rule is, “…to clarify and incorporate safeguards that will
decrease the likelihood of a blowout during drilling operations on the OCS. The safeguards
address well bore integrity and well control equipment, and this interim final rule focuses on
those two overarching issues (Department of the Interior 2010) .”
These are significant regulatory changes, and the value of past events for predicting
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future events is uncertain. Past events are nevertheless a potentially valuable basis for
determining the desirable capabilities of a subsea capping stack and future research focused on
minimizing the frequency and impact of future deepwater blowouts.
1.3.3 Research Tasks
One of the goals of the capping stack project is to answer the question, “What
supplementary capabilities should be provided by additional modules to achieve all the functions
likely to be necessary for an effective subsea capping, containment and intervention system?”
The tasks defined for this research to address that goal and provide a means for addressing
similar questions in the future were to accomplish the following for each well control or well
fluid spill incident:
1. Identify and categorize the operation in progress and the related flow paths for all
incidents where the well was the source of the fluids released.
2. Identify and categorize the points where formation fluids were released to the
environment.
3. Identify and categorize the relevant attachment points for a capping or containment
system.
4. Identify and categorize methods used to control and stop the release.
5. Identify methods used to capture or contain well fluids in these incidents.
6. Identify the potential relevance of a well intervention capability in responding to the
incident.
7. Identify any critical factors which could have contributed to a release of greater
magnitude.
8. Identify any critical factors which did contribute to a release of a lesser magnitude.
9

9. For all objectives above, identify shallow water events which could be equivalent to
future deepwater events and identify what differences would exist had the event
occurred in the deepwater.
A brief description of why these tasks are important and why they were chosen is needed
to explain how they will help meet the project objectives. Identifying the operation in progress
when the release occurred will help define the possible flow paths for the fluids. The operation
in progress also helps to define the context in which the response will be made. For example, the
equipment and methods needed to address a problem on a drilling well with a rig on location are
likely to be very different than for responding to a leak from a subsea completion.
The flow path of the formation fluids is important because the flow path defines the
possible barriers in the flow path which could be used to stop the flow of formation fluids.
Additionally, knowing the flow path can help identify the barriers which failed. The knowledge
of the flow path can also help identify the options available for stopping the flow.
Knowing the release point helps to identify the equipment or piece of equipment which
actually failed. This helps to identify the equipment the capping stack will need to attach to in
order to capture or contain the fluids. Knowing what piece of equipment failed and how it failed
will help identify if that equipment can be the attachment point, or if another piece of equipment
upstream needs to be the attachment point.
The methods used to stop the flow of formation fluids is important because understanding
what was used in the past can imply which barriers are most likely to be successful at stopping
the flow of formation fluids in future events. And help determine if additional equipment is
needed to implement these methods. Additional equipment needs will define how long a method
may take to implement.

10

Knowing what methods have been used in the past to capture and contain flow can imply
what types of methods can be incorporated into the capping stack design, and what methods
should be focused on for future study.
Knowing what vertical intervention methods have been used in the past will help define
what, if any, vertical intervention capabilities should be included in the capping stack design.
Critical factors which contributed to increasing or reducing the overall size of the spill are
expected to be helpful for both identifying factors which should be considered in the design of
future systems. Knowing what factors reduced the severity in the past can help reduce the
severity of future events. If critical factors from past incidents appear in future incidents the
risks associated with those factors can be more easily identified and mitigated.
These tasks will be accomplished by examining the past 15 years of incidents in the Gulf
of Mexico. However, it is also relevant to examine past research into this area to determine the
current states of industry knowledge. Additionally, the past research was also helpful in
providing the background into how to create a repeatable, systematic methodology for evaluating
past events.

11

2

LITERATURE REVIEW

A review of published research and analysis of blowouts and offshore risks provided an
excellent starting place for developing the methods to be used in this investigation and for
identifying what data should be collected from the incident descriptions as well as considering
conclusions and understanding developed in past studies. There are several papers which
examine past incidents and attempt to determine trends from those past incidents. This was the
starting place for the literature research. Next, the subject of each task was researched; operation
in progress which implies possible flow paths, release points with corresponding attachment
points, blowout response modes of control or barriers established after a blowout, capture and
containment of released fluids, vertical intervention and finally what changes occur as a result of
deepwater operations. A solid foundational knowledge of each topic was obtained during this
examination of past research.
In the early 1970’s just after the Santa Barbara spill (1969), a series of studies were
published with regard to oil spill statistics (Devanney and Stewart 1974; Stewart 1975; Stewart
and Kennedy 1978). The data for these studies was obtained from the United States Coast Guard
(USCG) for the years 1971-1975. In the 1980’s, there was one report on offshore blowouts
(Danenberger 1980). The data for this study was obtained from the United States Geological
Survey (USGS), the original federal agency tasked with obtaining data on offshore blowouts, for
the years 1971-1978. In the 1990’s, there were three published papers on blowouts
(Danenberger 1993; Podio and Skalle 1998; Skalle and Podio 1999). All these reports used the
USGS data as well as data from the Minerals Management Service, the agency which took over
from the USGS. The years for the Danenberger report are 1971-1991. For the two Podio and
Skalle reports, the years are 1960-1996. It is important to note that most of these papers use the
12

same incidents as the source of their data. Additionally, there was one book published in 1997
by Holand which examined past blowouts worldwide (including the GOM) (Holand 1997).
These papers and book were discussions of trends seen in past incidents. The Devanney paper
was a statistical analysis of the volume and number of spills of past incidents. The first
Danenberger paper was a listing of the development and exploratory drilling, and non-drilling,
blowouts. The later Danenberger paper was a more in depth discussion of past drilling-specific,
gas blowouts. The analysis includes contributing causes, duration, water depth, rig type and
blowout vs. activity graphs. The first Skalle and Podio paper focused on blowout depth,
operation in progress, blowout causes, and blowouts vs. activity graphs for drilling blowouts
only. The later paper focused on modes of control, duration, pollution, fire, explosion, and
fatalities. The Holand book focused on blowout causes and characteristics including ignition
source, pollution, duration, and flow mediums as well as blowout response failures and an
analysis of blowouts vs. accumulated operating time. The analysis of blowouts vs. activity and
blowouts vs. accumulated operating time provided the starting point for the analysis shown in
Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3 in the introduction section.
Skalle and Podio (1998) concluded that approximately equal numbers of exploration and
development drilling blowouts had occurred in the incidents in their study. Completion and
workover blowouts were less frequent than drilling blowouts, but were about equal in number to
each other. The fewest number of incidents were wireline blowouts.
The sections of these studies which are of interest will be addressed in the following
sections; operation in progress, flow paths, release points and resulting attachment points,
barriers established by the blowout response efforts, shut in of a well, capture of released
formation fluids, containment of formation fluids, vertical intervention to control formation flow
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and conditions in deepwater which are different from shallow water blowouts.

2.1 Operation in Progress
The operation in progress when an incident occurs is extremely helpful because only
certain flow paths are possible during different operations. Flow paths are an important
characteristic of past incidents because they help identify the barriers present in the flow path.
Holand divided blowouts into the operational phase when the blowouts occurred (Holand
1997). Holand defined these divisions in his book, however the divisions used in this study were
included in the data provided by BSEE and were not modified. No definitions for the divisions
used by BSEE were found on the public website.

2.2 Flow Paths of Hydrocarbons During an Incident
Holand discussed flow paths, and his data captured the final flow path (Holand 1997).
His flow paths were defined as:


“Through the drillstring (or tubing where relevant)”



“Through the annulus (the well bore annulus)”



“Through outer annulus (between the casing strings)”



“Outside casing (outside the outer casing or conductor)”



“Underground blowout (subsurface blowout from one zone to another)”

Holand related these flow paths to operations that were in progress, i.e. shallow gas
drilling blowouts, deep drilling blowouts, completion, workover, and production blowouts. His
data concluded that shallow gas and deep drilling blowouts most commonly have a final flow
path through the wellbore annulus. Completion blowouts most commonly have a final flow path
through the tubing or drillstring. Workover blowouts most commonly have a final flow path
through the outer annulus. Production blowouts are almost equally likely to have final flow
14

paths; through the tubing, through the wellbore, through the outer annulus and outside the casing.
Petersen et al. (2011) defined another set of flow paths (Petersen et al. 2011). They
described four main flow paths “string, string annulus (or wellbore), outside casing annulus
(named annulus), and rock.” These can be seen in Figure 2-1. The definition used in this paper
comes from Petersen et al (2011). This is because the two definitions are nearly equivalent, the
only distinction being between underground blowouts and blowouts outside the casing string.
The data set for this study rarely had sufficient detail to determine between these two paths,
therefore the simpler model was chosen. Petersen et al (2011) uses the flow paths along with
barrier definitions to analyze the operational well safety during the well design process.

Figure 2-1: Four flow paths (per Peterson et al.)

2.3 Release Points and Corresponding Attachment Points
Holand discusses locations where formation fluids were released to the environment from
blowouts (release points) in his book (Holand 1997). His release points for shallow gas drilling
were: diverted flow, diverter system line eroded, diverter system line parted, at the drill floorthrough the rotary, from wellhead on the rig or platform, subsea wellhead, subsea release outside
the casing, from a subsea crater, and unknown (Holand 1997). The release points from Holand’s
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book for deep drilling were: at the drill floor-the choke manifold, at the drill floor-the rotary
table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring, the wellhead on the rig or platform, no surface
flow, the shaker room, the subsea BOP choke line, subsea release outside the casing or unknown.
The completion release points were at the drill floor-through the drill pipe valve, at the drill
floor-the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring or tubing, or unknown release
point. The workover release points were BOP valve outlet (snubbing BOP), from wellhead,
from christmas tree, at the drill floor-through the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the
drillstring or tubing, and the tubing valve. The production release points were from the
wellhead, the christmas tree, a subsea crater, and subsea christmas tree.
According to Holand, most shallow gas blowouts had the diverter as the release point.
Deep drilling blowouts were nearly equally divided between release points at the drill floorthrough the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring, from the wellhead on the
platform and unknown point of release. Completion blowouts were nearly equally divided
between all release points; at the drill floor-through the drill pipe valve, at the drill floor-through
the rotary, at the drill floor-through the top of the drillstring or tubing and unknown release point.
Workover blowouts were primarily at the drill floor-through the rotary table. Production
blowouts were primarily through the wellhead.
In 1999 PCCI Marine and Environmental Engineering wrote a paper discussing blowout
scenarios (PCCI Marine and Environmental Engineering 1999). Based on experience with
subsea blowouts, Wild Well Control Inc. identified for PCCI release points for deepwater
blowouts. During drilling, completion and workover operations, the release points were at the
wellhead connector, the BOP flange/hub connection, the choke/kill connection to the BOP, the
choke/kill stab on the lower marine riser package (LMRP), through the top of the riser, through
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the top of the drill pipe, casing hanger seals, and subsea broach outside the wellbore. For
producing well scenarios, the release points were: subsea wellhead, flowline, annulus valve,
subsea broach outside the wellbore, and casing hanger seals. These release points were
developed to determine the relative likelihood of each scenario and to rank the consequence of
each scenario as minor, severe, or catastrophic. The conclusion was that for drilling, completion,
and workover operations there were no specific release points that had a high probability,
however, there was a moderate probability of a blowout occurring with a release at the wellhead
connector, the choke/kill stab at the LMRP, through the riser, or due to a subsea broach.
Production operations also had no high probability release points, but a moderate probability
existed for a release from the annulus valve. The consequence analysis stated that a catastrophic
outcome could occur if the leak was through the drill pipe or a subsea broach for drilling,
workover, and completion operations. A severe consequence was possible for releases from the
wellhead connector, the riser, or the casing hanger seals. For production, a catastrophic outcome
was concluded to be likely only from a subsea broach and severe consequences likely as a result
from a release at the wellhead connector or the casing hanger seals.
Attachment points for a subsea containment system received little attention prior to the
Macondo incident. They were discussed only in the context that containment system similar to
the top hat collection system used for Ixtoc. It was believed a system could never be sealed to
the seabed (Burgess and Milgram 1983), sealing a system to subsea equipment was not discussed
in this paper at all. In 1985 the top hat type of system was again discussed by Brown and Root,
but attachment to subsea equipment was not mentioned (Brown & Root Development Inc, 1985).
A 1999 paper from PCCI Marine and Environmental Engineering discusses subsea attachment
points in terms of the impracticality of attaching to subsea equipment. They cite reports from
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Brown and Root in 1985, and a 1998 draft report from the International Association of Drilling
Contractors, as well as their own knowledge. They do indicate that future technology may allow
for subsea attachment points. Schubert et al (2011) discuss attachment points in the context of
installing valves on equipment located on the rig or platform. The paper indicates that attaching
to subsea equipment would be difficult, but that it has been accomplished in relatively shallow
water depths. No further details were given. The implication from these papers is that
throughout the decades attachment to subsea equipment was considered impractical or
impossible, and as a result, no further research was conducted in this area.

2.4 Establishing Barriers to Stop a Blowout
Holand defines barriers in the context of well control operations as; “A well barrier is an
item that, by itself, prevents flow of the well reservoir fluids from the reservoir to the
atmosphere” (Holand 1997). Two independent barriers are required for normal drilling and
production operations by BSEE (Department of Interior and Minerals Management Service
2010).
Table 2-1: Examples of barriers and barrier description (Holland 1997)
Operational
Barrier
Active Barrier
Passive Barrier

Conditional
Barrier

“A barrier that functions while the
operation is carried out.”
“An external action is required to
activate the barrier”
“A barrier in place that functions
continuously without any external
action.”
A barrier that is either not always in
place or not always capable of
functioning as a barrier.”

“Drilling mud, stuffing box”
“Blowout Preventer (BOP), Xmas
(Christmas) Tree, SCSSV”
“Casing, tubing, kill fluid, well packer”

Drill String Safety Valve

When a well is hydrostatically controlled (i.e. killed), the fluid column providing the
hydrostatic pressure is referred to as the primary barrier and the standard blowout equipment is
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the secondary barrier (Holand 1997). When a well is flowing, the barriers closest to the reservoir
are regarded as the primary barrier and any other barrier in the flow path downstream of the
primary barrier as secondary barriers (Holand 1997).
Holand described four general types of barriers: operational, active, passive, and
conditional barriers (Holand 1997). Examples of each are given in Table 2-1.
Well barrier analysis is used in Norway to evaluate potential well designs for blowout
risk (Holand 1997). Other papers did not discuss barriers per se; instead they discuss modes of
control. The modes of control identified did provide a starting set of barriers for the well barrier
analysis conducted on this data. Danenberger identified bridging, pumping mud, closing the
BOP and “mechanical means” for controlling blowouts, which he doesn’t define (Danenberger
1980) as modes of control. Kato and Adams (1991) identified seven modes of control occurring
worldwide, on land and offshore. They were bridging, relief wells, pumping mud/kill fluid,
cementing, capping, shut-in and other (undefined) methods. Danenberger, identified three
generic categories based on his review of GOM blowouts (E.P. Danenberger 1993). They were
“mud/ cement/ mechanical”, bridging, and dissipation of trapped gas. Skalle and Podio (1999)
identified eight categories, listed here in order of frequency: bridging, pumping mud, pumping
cement slurry, closing the BOP, depleting small reservoirs, installing equipment to stop flow and
drilling relief wells. They identified capping as an eighth mode of control for onshore incidents,
but not for offshore incidents.

2.5 Capture and Containment Methods for Blowouts
Since 1979, the concept for subsea collection has been based on the riser and funnel
collection device used at Ixtoc in the Bay of Campeche. In the aftermath of that blowout, several
studies looked at the feasibility of such a collection system. The research was headed by Jerome
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Milgram at Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a grant from the Mineral Management
Service’s Technology Assessment and Research Program. The work completed by Milgram
included theoretical research as well as some scale model tests (J. H. Milgram and Burgess 1981;
J. H. Milgram 1982; Burgess and Milgram 1983; J. Milgram and Erb 1984). There were other
studies in the early 1980’s however, they are similar in content to the Milgram studies and were
not used for background for this thesis. In the mid 1980’s, two papers were written, one
examined the feasibility of commissioning a tanker as a full time response vessel with this type
of collection device permanently mounted on the vessel (Brown & Root Development Inc.
1985). The second provides a independent, detailed analysis of the specifications for a riser and
funnel type collection device which could be expected to collect hydrocarbons from a subsea
release (Hammett 1985). Since then, there have been two significant works in this area. The
first one in 1991 by Neal Adams Firefighters and the second in 1999 by PCCI Marine and
Environmental Engineering. Adams provides a background as to what has been attempted in the
past or designed but never implemented. This implies some of these concepts have been around
since before the beginning of the data set, and their implementation could be found in the data to
be evaluated. The PCCI report also provides background into what has been thought of in the
past. The author of the PCCI report conducted a patent search for subsea collection devices, and
included the patents discovered in their final paper. All these papers provide a good starting
point for potential capture or containment devices which could be seen in the data set if their use
was attempted and recorded.

2.6 Vertical Intervention
Adams and Kuhlman (1993) describe any attempt to control an offshore blowing well
from a floating vessel vertically located above the blowing well as vertical intervention. In
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contrast, Schubert et al. (2004) indicate that vertical intervention means entering the wellbore
from the mudline or from a vessel above or from equipment located in the sea column or on the
sea floor, for the purposes of well control. This would not include a relief well. Nor would it
include the removal of damaged subsea equipment, unless that equipment is within the wellbore.
Therefore it would not include the removal of the BOP but would include the removal of tubing
or drill pipe within the BOP. The Schubert et al (2004) definition is used hereafter in this study.
If there is any ambiguity within this thesis in the meaning or intent it will be clarified.
One technology used for vertical intervention is a snubbing unit. The most recent paper
is from 2010 just prior to Macondo. It discusses using snubbing units for well control operations
(Wehrenberg and Baxter 2010). Snubbing units are systems designed to force pipe into a well
against pressure. Traditionally, snubbing units have been used in workover and production
operations. A coil tubing unit has similar uses and capabilities.
Vertical intervention can be applied to enter a well to reestablish hydrostatic control or to
install some kind of mechanical barrier or repair a mechanical barrier already in the hole. These
could include setting a packer, or repairing a surface controlled subsurface safety valve
(SCSSV).

2.7 Implications for Deepwater Operations
Deepwater blowouts present special challenges. Therefore, the International Association
of Drilling Contractors has published a 400 page reference providing guidelines and best
practices for deepwater well control operations (International Association of Drilling Contractors
2002). It includes guidelines for planning deepwater wells, well control procedures, deepwater
equipment, emergency response, and training for deepwater crews. While the guidelines do not
typically include supporting technical details, they do support an understanding of some of the
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risks currently identified with deepwater operations.
There are five additional papers which discuss the differences experienced when drilling
in deepwater versus shallow water or onshore. The first paper from Nakagawa and Lage (1994)
discussed deepwater kick detection, difficulties with shutting in a well, killing procedures,
contingency plans, and emergency disconnects while drilling. The MMS discussed the
challenges involved with deepwater spill response including some details from their database of
well permit applications, production records and past blowouts (LaBelle and Lane 2001).
Adams et al (2003), attempt to characterize blowout behavior in deepwater environments,
including problems often encountered and some background research that has been conducted.
Texas A&M University looked at modeling deepwater blowouts and provided good background
into unique aspects of deepwater operations as well as methods of controlling deepwater
blowouts (Noynaert and Schubert 2005; Schubert et al. 2004). The last paper discusses a drilling
application for deepwater wells and provides confirmation for some of the data presented in the
above papers (Fossli and Sangesland 2006).

2.8 Summary
Past research related to flow paths, release points and related attachment points, barriers
used to stop the flow of formation fluids (i.e. modes of control), past capture and containment
methods, vertical intervention and finally changes to operations when they are conducted in
deepwater was described. This information provides a solid foundation for guiding the
development and organization of the information to be included in the investigation of past
blowout and spill incidents.
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3

METHODS

3.1 Introduction
The research described in this thesis had two general objectives. The primary objective
was to help define the operational requirements for an effective capping stack system. The
second objective was to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on offshore
blowouts for use in future research on improving the understanding of, responses to, and
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills. This chapter will discuss the methods developed
and applied to organize the data from offshore blowouts for these purposes. It will describe the
source data, inclusion and exclusions of incidents from the final spreadsheet, a description of the
additional data needed and how it was obtained, the reason the additional data was obtained and
how it helped to meet the objectives.
The evaluation of prior incidents began with collecting the information about those prior
incidents; however, a simple listing of the incidents would not meet the objectives. Therefore it
was determined a spreadsheet would be the most efficient method of presenting the data so it was
searchable and able to answer the questions needed to meet the objectives. The objectives ask
questions about the flow paths of incidents, the release points of incidents, the related attachment
points, the methods used to stop the flow of formation fluids, including capturing or containing
the flow of formation fluids, methods of vertical intervention used to stop the flow of formation
fluids, any factors which reduced or increased the total release of fluids, and how deepwater
incidents will vary from past shallow water incidents. Therefore the spreadsheet must be able to
identify these factors and extract patterns from past incidents.

3.2 Source of Data
The source of data on the relevant spills and blowouts was information on the incidents
reported to BSEE in the past 15 years. The data used for the study was obtained from the BSEE
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website. A complete listing of the website addresses where the data is located is included in
APPENDIX 2: URL’S OF BSEE SOURCE DATA. A listing of all incidents reported to BSEE
is organized by year on the public website. During the course of the data collection process, the
data available on the website changed several times. Therefore, the data that is available today
may not be the data which was available when this collection of incidents was conducted. Every
effort was made to obtain the most up to date information.
The incidents reported to BSEE were sorted into the following categories; blowouts,
pollution events (fluid spills), pipeline pollution events, fires, explosions, injuries and fatalities,
as well as vessel collisions, crane incidents, gas releases, hydrogen sulfide releases, structural
damage to vessels, rigs, and platforms, disabled safety systems, muster for evacuation incidents
and other miscellaneous incidents. The pollution events were fluid spills of any size from any
source of fluid. For example, a vessel which spilled diesel oil as a result of a refueling incident
was included in this category.
Obviously, not all of the incidents reported to BSEE were relevant to this study. However,
the intent of the data collection initially was to include as many incidents as possible to ensure no
relevant incident was discarded prematurely. The incidents which were not included in the
initial spreadsheet were the crane events, the structural damage to property, the disabled safety
systems, the muster for evacuation incidents, and the other miscellaneous incidents. The
incidents relating to blowouts, pollution incidents, pipeline pollution incidents, fires, explosions,
injuries and fatalities were initially included. This resulted in nearly 1,000 incidents. When
these incidents were examined, duplicates were discovered. Any incident which fell into
multiple categories was listed in both categories. For example, a blowout which resulted from a
vessel strike was listed in both the vessel collision category as well as the blowout category.
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Therefore, the listing of incidents was further refined to include only those incidents included in
the blowout event, pollution event and pipeline pollution event categories. Pipeline incidents
were discarded as the capping stack solution was not likely to be relevant to these types of losses.
Additionally, pollution events with a spill size less than 50 barrels (bbls) have minimal reporting
requirements, only the time, date, location, and size of the spill. As a result, these spills were
only included if sufficient data was available to be useful. Therefore, the level of confidence that
the most relevant spills were captured using this methodology is high.
The final number of spills in the initial spreadsheet was just under 450 incidents. Of the
450 incidents, 86 were blowout events, and the rest were pollution events. In nearly all of the
pollution incidents, the fluid spilled was not formation fluids. For example, many pollution
spills involved drilling mud being spilled over the side of the rig. These types of events were not
relevant to meeting the objectives of this study. Therefore these incidents were not included in
the final collection.
Hurricane events caused a particular complication. These events are listed as pollution
events (unless a blowout occurred, then they would be cross-listed). However, if the hurricane
damaged a platform and it took a period of weeks, months or years to stop the formation fluids
from leaking to the environment, the BSEE required the operator to report the spill for each
separate platform on a quarterly basis until the spill was stopped. This sometimes resulted in
several dozen reported incidents for each platform, all the result of one hurricane. Each platform
damaged by a hurricane was reported to BSEE as a unique incident regardless of the number of
wells tied back to each platform. The incidents had to be combined into a single total pollution
event on the date the hurricane damage occurred. This required some creative analysis because
the data was scattered through the annual spill reports, individual hurricane spill reports and the

25

basic data filed for spills less than 50 bbls. The URL’s for the hurricane spill reports and spills
less than 50 bbl are listed in Appendix 2. After this analysis, a collection of 90 incidents were
determined relevant for this study. The details collected from the public database on these
incidents included the date of the incident, the company name, the type and volume of fluid
spilled, how the incident was cross-listed (i.e. fire, blowout, explosion, pollution, etc.), lease
number, operation in progress, area and block location in the Gulf of Mexico, water depth, the
name of the platform, rig, or vessel involved and a brief description of the incident (typically a
paragraph).
One of the first tasks to analyze the data was to determine which of the events had floating
rig/platforms and which were bottom founded. The data provided to BSEE did not include
sufficient detail to confirm floating or bottom founded rig/platforms for all incidents as a result,
the definition of deepwater used by industry and BSEE, a water depth of 1,000 ft. or greater, was
used by in this study.

3.3 Additional Analysis Conducted on BSEE Data
In order to meet the objectives of, and fulfill the tasks defined for, this study (i.e. flow path,
release points, etc.) it was necessary to determine additional details about each of these 90
incidents. These additional details became additional columns in the spreadsheet, they included:


Location of release (i.e. sub-system where the formation fluid first entered the
natural environment)



Flow path from reservoir to location of release



Sub-systems where blowout response methods were attached or could have been
attached (i.e. first sub-system upstream of the location of release where a blowout
response method could be attached)
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Whether vertical intervention was used or could have been used to control the
blowout, and if attempted, what methods were used



Whether the well was shut-in in the course of the well control efforts, and if so how
was the well shut in



Whether the blowout response methods captured any of the formation fluids, and if
so how was the flow captured



Whether the flow of formation fluids were diverted, and if so how was the flow
diverted



Factors that contributed to a more severe release



Factors that contributed to a less severe release

3.3.1 Spreadsheet Columns
The analysis conducted above was then integrated into the spreadsheet. In order to make
the spreadsheet useful, the analysis needed to be sortable. Therefore, each analysis was reduced
to 1) a yes or no question, if possible, or if a description was needed, 2) a simple one to two word
description or 3) a code to describe a combination or sequence of actions or results.
Additionally, for each analysis a further grouping was needed to extract useful relationships. For
example, from the 90 incidents, 65 unique release points were identified. These 65 release points
were then grouped into 17 more general categories. A similar grouping occurred for each
analysis which did not involve a yes or no response. For each analysis, the initial unique values
were retained and a second column was added which contained the larger groupings.
3.3.1.1 Flow Path
The Petersen model for flow paths was used for this study. Figure 3-1is a diagram showing
the four general flow paths defined by Petersen (2011).
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Figure 3-1 Flow Paths from Reservoir to Release Point (Petersen et al. 2011)

The wellbore flow path is any flow up the casing, but not inside the drillstring or tubing.
The string flow path is any flow up the drillstring or tubing. The annulus flow path is any flow
of fluids between casing and another casing or casing and the rock, but not traveling through the
rock (i.e. not an underground blowout). The rock flow path is any underground blowout
reaching the sea floor. These definitions are helpful to this study because these four paths have
very different barriers along their respective flow paths. The wellbore and string are designed to
have flow through them but have different barriers to control or prevent flow. The annulus flow
path should generally have a cement sheath along critical sections of the path to prevent fluid
flow to the surface or sea floor. The rock flow path has no man made barriers in the rock but
implies that a barrier in one of the other flow paths failed and allowed formation fluids into the
earth. Often the details of the incident were unclear, and the exact flow path was not explicitly
stated. However, if well control equipment was used to control the flow, its use sometimes
helped to determine the flow path. If however, the details of the incident were such that the flow
path was unclear, the entry was tagged as unknown flow path.
The annulus flow path was selected if the flow was outside the deepest string of casing
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set in the well but still coming to the surface at the wellhead. Flow coming through a casing
valve was considered to indicate an annulus flow path.
On several occasions, multiple flow paths were valid. For example if there was flow up
both the wellbore and the string, or if the incident details describe attempting to stop flow in the
string and wellbore, then both were selected.
Initially, an analysis with as much detail as the incident description allowed for each flow
path was completed. This analysis resulted in 49 unique flow paths. This number of unique
flow paths meant that any further analysis of the data would result in data sets of one or at the
most two incidents. It was determined this variability was too great to meet the objectives set
forth in this study.
3.3.1.2 Release Location
The location where formation fluids were released to the environment was an important
factor, because it defines what equipment the capping stack needs to attach to. A simple diagram
is the best way to begin describing the release locations (see Figure 3-2). The figure also shows
the codes used to define a particular release point in the spreadsheet.
The release point for each of the 90 incidents was determined and, as stated earlier, 65
unique release points were identified. These are the initial release points. Based on those release
points, a system of coding was developed to allow the column to be sorted and searched. 1 is the
release point code for a release from the seafloor itself (i.e. an underground blowout). The codes
begin at the seafloor and progress to the platform, as shown in Figure 3-2. The platform code
was then further divided to describe the equipment on the platform. When the 65 unique release
points were sorted, a total of 13 codes were used. These are listed in Table 3-1.
The combined knowledge of the release point and the flow path from the reservoir to the
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release location allows determination of the location where a capping system could be attached.
Release from surface equipment including:
•Drilling Floor/Rotary Table - 10
•Wellhead – 10 W
•BOP/Stripper rubber – 10 BOP
•Diverter – 10 D
•Christmas Tree – 10 XT

Release at Casing above Seafloor - 4.5

Equipment Prevented Release - 0

Release at BOP - 5

Release at Wellhead - 4
Vent at Seafloor/ Underground Blowout - 1

Diagrams provided by
Shell Training

Figure 3-2: Release Points with Coding (Smith 2011)

Table 3-1: Grouped Release Points and Location of Release Points
Release Point
Equipment Prevented Release
Vent at the Seafloor
Subsea Wellhead
Casing above Seafloor
Subsea BOP
Subsea Templates
Rig Floor Equipment
Rig Equipment (not at Rig Floor)
Xmas Tree
BOP/Stripper Rubber
Diverter System
Wellhead
Chemical Injection Line

Code
0
1
4
4.5
5
8
10
10 S
10 XT
10 BOP
10 D
10 W
10 CI
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Location
N/A
Seafloor
Subsea
Subsea
Subsea
Subsea
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface
Surface

3.3.1.3 Attachment Points
A capping stack or containment system must be able to be attached to a leaking well at or
upstream of the point of release. Once each release point had been identified, the first upstream
piece of equipment capable of a creating a barrier or allowing attachment of a barrier or device
which can create a barrier was determined. This was the attachment point recorded in the
spreadsheet. For example, if the release point was the mud gas separator but the BOP was
operational then the attachment point selected was the BOP, if however, the BOP was damaged
or inoperable then the attachment point was the wellhead. There were multiple incidents where
the wellhead was located at the surface. In several of these incidents, the release location was
below the wellhead but above the seafloor. In those situations, the attachment point was
considered the casing above the seafloor. There were several incidents where a workover was
being conducted through a christmas tree. In these incidents, if the tree was intact and
operational it was selected as the attachment point.
3.3.1.4 Vertical Intervention
For the purposes of this paper, vertical intervention is defined as listed in Chapter 2. It
means entering the wellbore with a work string or tools from a vessel above the well, or from
equipment located in the sea column or on the sea floor, for the purposes of well control.
Pumping kill fluid through a choke or kill line (i.e. bullheading), or circulation through a
workstring already in the well does not require intervention. However, intervention does include
bullheading fluids into or circulating into the wellbore if drill pipe or a work string had to be
snubbed into the well to do so.
The categories in this field include:


Yes, vertical intervention was attempted
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No, vertical intervention was not attempted



Vertical intervention could not have been attempted without removal of obstacles in
the wellbore



Vertical intervention could have been attempted but was not



It is unknown if intervention was attempted



It is unknown if intervention could have been possible

If the method of intervention was stated in the incident description, this was also included
in this field.
3.3.1.5 Shut-In
This column indicates whether or not shut-in was attempted. The choices for this column
were simple: yes or no. If the incident description did not provide sufficient detail to determine
if shut-in was attempted, that is captured in this column as well as “unknown.” If the shut-in
resulted in an underground blowout, that detail was not captured in this field. It was captured in
the coding of the operational sequence of events, which is explained below.
3.3.1.6 Capture of Formation Fluids
This column indicates if there was some attempt to capture formation fluids on the
rig/platform or vessel in during these incidents. This column has a yes if the incident details
discuss capturing fluids in any way. The definition of capture of formation fluids does not
include the use of booms or other collection equipment after the fluids reach the sea surface.
This column only captures whether or not fluids were captured and transported directly from the
release location to a storage vessel or container. For example, in one incident the flow was slow
enough and the process tanks large enough, that the flow was diverted to a process tank on the
platform and therefore prevented from entering the sea environment.
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3.3.1.7 Diversion of Formation Flow
Diverting the flow of formation fluids from its original path is often desirable to protect
personnel and equipment or to facilitate vertical intervention. Instances where flow was known
to be diverted are recorded in this column. The majority of the events where flow was diverted
used the standard diverter equipment at the surface. Common uses were to divert gas away from
the rig before a BOP had been installed and to deal with gas in the riser above a subsea BOP. If
the incident description was not clear if flow was diverted, that was captured in this field as well.
When flow was diverted without using the surface diverter system, the equipment used to divert
the flow was described to the extent it was known or could be implied from the incident
description.
3.3.1.8 Contributing and Mitigating Factors
A pollution or blowout incident often involves factors that contribute to or mitigate the
severity and longevity of the event. This column was used to capture the details of the incidents
that could be related to making the outcome of the incident better or worse. No attempt was
made to distinguish positive factors versus negative factors because many factors can have both
positive and negative impacts. Take for instance the kink in the riser at the Macondo incident.
This incident reduced the flow of fluids from the riser; however this kink also increased the
pressure in the wellbore which became a threat to the burst discs in the casing string.
Additionally, the kink in the riser was an obstacle which had to be removed before the capping
stack could be attached to the LMRP. Therefore, this field is used to identify important factors
that might imply positive or negative impacts and that if not present or compromised, would alter
the severity of the event.
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3.3.1.9 Well Bridging
A common perception is that the most frequent successful control of a blowout is that the
well has bridged (Skalle and Podio 1998; Holand 1997; Skalle and Podio 1999). Therefore, this
is a positive mitigating factor which needs to be investigated, especially to investigate its
relevance in deepwater. Adams and Kuhlman(1991) state that a well will often bridge within 24
hours, although some blowout for an extended period of time. This 24 hour time limit is
referenced several times in industry literature (Noynaert and Schubert 2005; Schubert et al. 2004;
Neal Adams Firefighters Inc. 1991). Neal Adams Firefighters states that his conclusion is the
result of over 1,000 blowouts in the database for Neal Adams Firefighters. The data collected in
the past 15 years shows that the wells that did bridge (27%) were split about 50-50 between
those that bridged in less than 24 hours and those that bridged 1 to 9 days after the blowout
began. This study is not focused on well bridging; however the data from the past 15 years
conflicts with the earlier reports which state there is a greater likelihood of well bridging to occur
within 24 hours.
The data collected in these fields was used to address tasks 4-8, from Section 1.3.3. The
source data can be found online at the URL’s listed in Appendix 1. The summary descriptive
data directly from the BSEE website are recorded in the first columns of the spreadsheet. The
results of the analysis described herein were recorded in the subsequent columns. Finally, there
is a section of columns recording codes to describe the events more completely. These source
and meaning of these codes are described below.

3.4 Reduction of the Incident Description to a Code
The incident descriptions provide a great deal of information but were not helpful when
searching for data or for sorting the data into groups to determine relationships between incidents
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or between events or actions within an incident. Therefore a simple, logical, repeatable method
needed to be developed to reduce the words in the incident description to codes which could then
be searched and sorted on. Using the model of blowouts as barrier failures and blowout response
as steps taken to reestablish barriers, the details which needed to be captured from the incident
description became clear. For each incident, the response to that incident needed to be captured
in terms of the attempts that were made to establish a barrier. For each attempt, there were
several items of interest which needed to be captured: first, where the barrier was being
established; second, what type of barrier was being established; third, what type of equipment
was used to establish the barrier; fourth, how the barrier was established; fifth, whether the
barrier was established successfully; sixth, why the barrier was not established; and seventh, did
the barrier stop the uncontrolled flow of formation fluids. The entire list of responses, or codes,
used to indicate the locations, type of barrier, equipment used, reasons the barrier was not
established are given in Appendix 3.
These codes were the starting point for systematically analyzing the response to all the
incidents. The data collected from this sequencing has been helpful in identifying industry
patterns, and it is expected that it could be useful in identifying patterns within companies and
determining if there are any gaps in the well control response training. If known, the time when
well control specialists were brought on site were identified. This will help determine what
actions were taken by on site personnel or specialists. In 1993, Adams and Kuhlman discussed
contingency planning and included a brief discussion on response. They divided blowout
management into three stages. Early response includes the predetermined operations which are
implemented without changes regardless of the circumstances of the blowout. Second, blowout
containment operations are designed to mitigate or minimize damage resulting from the blowout.
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And finally, blowout control, which involves the steps taken by well control specialists to stop
the formation flow (Adams and Kuhlman 1993). The current design and specifications of a
capping stack envision it being implemented in the third stage by specialists due to its size,
complexity, the need to prepare it for the specific situation, and to transport it to the location.
An example will help to define the creation and use of these codes. Because the responses
to the Macondo event are so well known, that incident will be used.
The initial steps taken are listed in the Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report
(BP 2010). The first well control response begins on page 27. It states, on April 20, 2010, at
9:41pm, the following attempt was made: “Diverter closed and flow routed to mud gas separator
(MGS);…”. The code sequence for this attempt is: 6D/D/DIV/MGS/N/ATD/N.
The first section of the code is 6D; this indicates the diverter system on the rig floor was
the location of this first attempt to establish a barrier. The second section of the code is D, this
indicates the type of barrier being established, it was not a barrier per se, but the flow was
diverted to maintain personnel safety to allow further operations, in this case, on the rig floor.
The third section of the code is DIV; this indicates the standard diverter system on the rig was
used. The fourth section of the code is MGS, this indicates that the standard diverter system was
activated, and flow was diverted to the mud gas separator. The fifth section is N, this indicates
the barrier was not established. Since diverting the flow is not a barrier per se, no barrier was
established. The sixth section is ATD, this indicates that the attempt was to divert flow rather
than establish a barrier. The seventh section is N, this indicates the flow from the well was not
stopped. This example shows an initial diversion attempt by the on-site personnel. This attempt
is used to show an example of the code when a barrier was not created but the attempt was
successful at something other than establishing a barrier (i.e. activating the diverter system).
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The next example is for a successful establishment of a barrier. This occurred much later in
the well control response. The well control specialists were on site when this attempt occurred in
mid July. The example is for the installation of the sealing capping stack. The written
description was: “Install sealing cap”. The code sequence for this attempt is: 4/M/CAPST
/STAB/Y/-/Y!.
The first section of the code is a 4, this indicates the location of the barrier is the lower
marine riser package. The second section of the code is M, this indicates the barrier being
installed is a mechanical barrier, the third section of the code is CAPST, this indicates a capping
stack was the equipment being used to install the mechanical barrier, the fourth section is STAB,
this indicates the capping stack was installed in the open position allowing fluids to escape
through the stack and once the stack was in place the valves were closed. The fifth section is Y,
this indicates the barrier was successfully installed, the sixth section is blank because the barrier
was successfully established, the seventh section is a Y!, which indicates the barrier successfully
stopped the flow and was the first barrier reestablished after the blowout.
Using these codes and searching for an “!” for example will result in all the incidents where
the primary barrier was established. Then the location, equipment, and success rate of these
primary barriers can be compared, and relationships can be identified. Additionally, these codes
were used to verify what equipment was used to shut-in wells after blowouts and to identify how
often containment attempts were successful. The potential uses for this type of coding are
intended to go far beyond this study.

3.5 Summary
The approach used to organize the incident data for this research was centered on creation
of a searchable, sortable spreadsheet. The columns in the spreadsheet included the public data
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from BSEE, additional columns addressing specific questions about the incident description and
finally, a set of columns with the response sequence coding. This spreadsheet was then used to
reveal the most frequently encountered situations and these were used to determine the modules
needed for an effective capping stack system. It is intended to also be useful for additional
research focused on determining the expected distribution of severity and locations for possible
future blowouts and as a basis for investigating means to minimize the risk of occurrence and the
impact of possible future blowouts.
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4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section is a summary and brief discussion of the results obtained from the analysis
of the spreadsheet. Additionally, if the results suggest operational requirements which should be
considered in the design of a generally applicable capping stack system, it is included here. The
topics follow the objectives listed in Chapter 1, Section 3. Finally, there are results sections
listed here which are a synthesis of two or more topics, which suggest additional capabilities for
modules of the capping stack system.

4.1 Operation in Progress
The operation in progress when the blowout occurred is the logical starting point for
looking at the results. This is how Holand (1999) organized his entire book. This is because as
stated earlier, the operation in progress defines possible flow paths. For different operations,
different flow paths are possible and impossible. Table 4-1 shows the number of incidents by
operation and the relative frequency of that operation. The relative frequency is the number of
incidents divided by 90, the total number of incidents. The operation in progress is a column that
was provided by BSEE. These data were not examined or modified from what was available in
the public data. These data however can be grouped into slightly more general categories to
allow trends to be seen. If drilling, completion and workover operations (including logging)
were combined, the total number of incidents in this category is 59 incidents with a relative
frequency of 65.56%. Production is the next largest category followed by P&A and Post P&A,
suspended operations (for a hurricane) and finally soil boring.
The data in Table 4-1 shows very clearly that drilling, workover and completion
operations are the most likely source of blowouts. The other item of note is the suspended
operations category due to hurricanes. In the past 15 years, there were a total of 95 incidents
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where a rig or platform allowed fluids to be released as the result of a hurricane. Of those 95
incidents, only 5 are included in this study, including three that are listed in the P&A or Post
P&A operations. The other 90 hurricane incidents released fluids from storage tanks located on
the rig or platform and not from the well.
Table 4-1: Operation in Progress and Relative Frequency of Occurrence (All
Incidents)
Operation
Drilling
Completion
Completion – Gravel Pack
Logging
Workover
Production
P&A
Post P&A
Soil Boring
Suspended (for a Hurricane)

No of Incidents
41
8
2
1
7
17
8
3
1
2

Relative Frequency
45.56%
8.89%
2.22%
1.11%
7.78%
18.89%
8.89%
3.33%
1.11%
2.22%

Additionally, what the data in Table 4-1 suggests is that for the capping stack to respond
to incidents at any point in time in the life of a well, the first priority should be drilling,
completion and workover operations, and second priority should be production. This should be
followed by plug and abandon and post plug and abandon operations. What this data also
implies is that the flow paths associated with drilling, completion and workover will be the most
likely flow paths encountered in these incidents.
4.1.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations
Table 4-2 shows the breakdown of the operation in progress for shallow water incidents
and for deepwater incidents. The drilling, completion, and workover operations account for 65%
of shallow water incidents and 67% of deepwater incidents. Production operations account for
19% of shallow water incidents and 20% of deepwater incidents. P&A and post P&A operations
40

account for 12% of shallow water incidents and 13.33% of deepwater incidents. This implies
that the operation in progress for deepwater incidents is very consistent with the shallow water
incidents even though there is a much smaller number (15) of deepwater incidents than in
shallow water (75 incidents).
Table 4-2: Operation in Progress Shallow vs. Deep Water Incidents

Operation
Drilling
Completion
Completion – Gravel Pack
Workover
Logging
Production
P&A
Post P&A
Soil Boring
Suspended (for a
Hurricane)

All
41
8
2
7
1
17
8
3
1

Rel.
Freq.
45.56%
8.89%
2.22%
7.78%
1.11%
18.89%
8.89%
3.33%
1.11%

Shallow
Water
34
6
2
7
0
14
8
1
1

Rel.
Freq.
45.33%
8.00%
2.67%
9.33%
0.00%
18.67%
10.67%
1.33%
1.33%

Deepwater
7
2
0
0
1
3
0
2
0

Rel.
Freq.
46.67%
13.33%
0.00%
0.00%
6.67%
20.00%
0.00%
13.33%
0.00%

2

2.22%

2

2.67%

0

0.00%

4.2 Flow Paths of Hydrocarbons During a Blowout
Table 4-3 shows the flow paths for each of the 90 incidents by operation. The wellbore
path is flow of fluids up the wellbore or the annulus between the wellbore and the string, the
string flow path is flow up the drillpipe, work string, or tubing. The string and wellbore flow
path is parallel flows up the wellbore as well as the string or tubing. The annulus flow path is
flow outside the primary casing but between outer casings or casing and the surrounding rock.
The annulus and wellbore flow path is flow up the wellbore as well as flow through an outer
annulus. These flows may be parallel or may be in series. The flow may have begun up the
wellbore and when shut in was attempted the flow stopped going up the wellbore and instead
found a path through the cement or casing. This approach was used for all instances with
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multiple paths. The unknown flow path is when the incident description did not provide
sufficient detail to determine the flow path. There are a total of 107 flow paths because each
individual flow path was counted, therefore the parallel or series flow paths were counted toward
the total for each of the flow paths they traveled.
Table 4-3: Flow Paths by Operation with Relative Frequency of Occurrence (All
Incidents)

Operation
Drilling/
WO/
Comp.
Production
P&A
Post P&A
Soil Boring
Suspended
(for a
Hurricane)
Totals:

Flow Paths (Relative Frequency = Num. of Incidents / 107)
Well
Annu
bore
RF String RF
lus
RF Rock RF Unk

RF

37

35%

14

13%

17

16%

4

4%

3

3%

3
3
0
1

3%
3%
0%
1%

7
5
0
0

7%
5%
0%
0%

2
1
0
0

2%
1%
0%
0%

0
0
0
0

0%
0%
0%
0%

5
0
3
0

5%
0%
3%
0%

1

1%

0

0%

0

0%

0

0%

1

1%

45

42%

26

24%

20

19%

4

4%

12

11%

RF = Relative Frequency

The data in Table 4-3 implies that the wellbore and string are the most frequent flow
paths with a total of 66% between the two. Likewise for the most frequent operations: drilling,
completion and workover, the wellbore is the most frequent path followed by the annulus path
and then the string path. This confirms the conclusion by Holand (1997). For production, the
most common path is the string, the path the formation fluids are designed to flow in. The string
path is followed by the unknown flow path. For P&A, the most common path is through the
string, followed by the wellbore. The flow paths for all post P&A incidents were unknown.
The number of underground blowouts (rock flow path) which broached to the seafloor is
4.4% (4/90 incidents). This statistic is misleading however, because any underground blowout
which does not broach would not be reported to BSEE, as no reservoir fluids would be released
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to the seafloor or atmosphere and current regulations do not require reporting of these types of
underground blowouts. An examination of 30 years of insurance loss history with regard to
underground blowouts suggests that operators report losses (equipment, etc.) relating to
underground blowouts 1.52 times more frequently than losses relating to surface blowouts
(Adams and Young 2004). This statistic is for land and offshore events and may not be
representative of the risk offshore; however, if we assume this statistic is generally applicable
that would mean that for the 86 surface blowouts (90 less the 4 UGBO) the number of
underground blowouts could be as high as 131 events. These two facts suggest that underground
blowouts may occur more often than suggested by the data.
Additionally, the rock and annulus flow path most often require a barrier placed upstream
of the beginning of this flow path in order to regain control of the well. Sometimes bullheading
can be used to regain control in incidents with a surface wellhead this is because of access to the
outer annuli are available through a surface wellhead.
4.2.1 Implications for Deepwater
Table 4-4 shows the breakdown of flow paths by water depth with the series and parallel
flow paths explicitly stated. For example, there are 8 incidents with both the string and wellbore
flow paths. Displaying the data in this manner reveals an interesting trend. No incidents with an
annulus flow path (without a rock flow path) have occurred yet in deepwater. This is may be due
to the fewer number of incidents in deepwater and does not necessarily reflect a trend of fewer
annulus flow paths in deepwater.
Nevertheless, it is logical that a generally applicable capping stack system should be able
to address flow up the wellbore and string or both as well as flow up through an outer annulus as
essentially all of these paths pass through the subsea wellhead. The module that was built to
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address the blowout at Macondo was attached to the wellhead housing via the BOP and LMRP
and therefore had the potential to be adapted to have these capabilities.
Table 4-4: Flow Path of Reservoir Fluids
Flow Path:
Wellbore Flow Path
String Flow Path
String & Wellbore
Annular Flow Path
Annular & Wellbore
Rock Flow Path Only
Annular & Rock
Wellbore & Rock
Annular, Wellbore & Rock
Unknown Flow Path

Events
31
18
8
13
4
0
2
1
1
12

Rel
Freq
34.44%
20.00%
8.89%
14.44%
4.44%
0.00%
2.22%
1.11%
1.11%
13.33%

Shallow
Water
27
17
6
13
4
0
1
1
0
6

Rel
Rel
Freq Deepwater Freq
36.00%
4
26.67%
22.67%
1
6.67%
8.00%
2
13.33%
17.33%
0
0.00%
5.33%
0
0.00%
0.00%
0
0.00%
1.33%
1
6.67%
1.33%
0
0.00%
0.00%
1
6.67%
8.00%
6
40.00%

In deepwater operations the subsea wellhead does not provide access to outer annuli.
Therefore, the option for bullheading from the subsea wellhead is not available. In these types of
incidents with a subsea wellhead, the only option available would be a relief well or vertical
intervention. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a subsea capping stack should have the
capability for vertical intervention to address these types of incidents.

4.3 Release Points
The point where the formation fluids were released into the environment is described as
the release point. For this study, release points located on the platform or rig account for 80% of
the incidents, subsea releases 8% and subsea equipment releases 7%. As expected for the
surface releases, the wellbore flow path is the most frequent flow path followed by the string
flow path. Note that if the actual flow paths involved more than one flow path element, it is
shown under each relevant column. For the subsea releases, the most common flow path is the
annulus flow path, followed closely by the wellbore, string and rock flow paths. For subsea
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equipment releases, unfortunately, the most common flow path is unknown. For incidents where
the release point is not known, the flow path is also not known. These incidents with the
unknown release points were small volume spills and had no incident descriptions. For the one
incident where the equipment prevented a release, the flow path was through the wellbore.
Table 4-5: Release Points by Location and Flow Path (All Incidents)

Release Point
Wellhead at surface
Surface Equipment @
Wellhead
Diverter at surface
BOP/Stripper Rubber at
surface
Surface Equipment on
Rig (away from
wellhead)
X-mas Tree at surface
Injection Line
Subtotal:

All
Incidents
20

All Incidents
Rel.
Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown
Platform Releases
22%
10
3
11
0
0

18

20%

13

8

0

1

0

12

13%

7

2

3

1

1

8

9%

7

2

1

0

0

9

10%

4

5

1

0

1

0
0
2

0
1
3

2
0

0
1

0
0
0

1
2
0

0

0

0

5

4
4%

12
11%

4
1
72

4%
1
3
0
1%
0
0
0
80%
42
23
16
Subsea Releases
Vent @ Seafloor
4
4%
2
0
3
Casing above seafloor
3
3%
0
2
0
Subtotal:
7
7%
Subsea Equipment Releases
Subsea Wellhead
2
2%
0
0
1
Subsea Template
2
2%
0
0
0
Subsea BOP
1
1%
0
1
0
Subtotal:
5
6%
Unknown Release Point and No Fluids Released
Equipment Prevented
1
1%
1
0
0
Release
Unknown
5
6%
0
0
0
Subtotal:
6
7%
Totals:
90
100%
45
26
20
Relative Frequency:
42%
24%
19%

The data in Table 4-5 implies that in the majority of these incidents the release point is on
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the platform or rig. This is expected because most of these incidents occurred in shallow water,
and the equipment where fluids likely be released are at the surface.
Additionally, there were several incidents (see Table 4-5) where fluids were released at
both the surface, and at the seafloor. There were also four incidents where an underground
blowout occurred. Of those four incidents, two of the underground blowouts resulted from shutin which increased the pressure and fractured the formation. For these incidents, the release
point changed as a result of well control operations. The other two began with underground
blowouts and included some flow up either the annulus or wellbore. This data suggests that
shutting in a well can cause an underground blowout. This suggests that the capping stack
system should address the possibility of, and the need to minimize the risk of, underground
blowouts.
Additionally, two incidents occurred which had a release point subsea and an annulus
flow path. These incidents used a pollution dome to collect hydrocarbons while well control
operations were underway. The likely reason the pollution dome was used was that attachment
to the sea floor equipment would have required custom built equipment which would have taken
time to build and transport to the site. These incidents imply a capping stack system should
include the capability to respond to these types of incidents.
4.3.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations
The small number of deepwater releases limits the significance of the deepwater data for
anticipating future release points. Nevertheless, these data combined with the knowledge from
shelf operations does imply some potential trends. Table 4-6 shows the release points by
location for only the deepwater incidents. There is a marked difference in location of the release
point. Only 40% of the releases occur at the platform or rig, 27% occur from subsea equipment
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and a further 13% occur subsea and from unknown release points. These unknown release points
are incidents without any incident description so no flow path is known for these incidents.
Table 4-6: Release Points by Location and Flow Path (Deepwater Incidents)
Deepwater Wells (>1,000 ft)
Release Point
Surface
Equipment @
Wellhead
Diverter at
surface
Injection Line
Subtotal:
Vent @ Seafloor
Subtotal:
Subsea Template
Subsea BOP
Subsea Wellhead
Subtotal:
Equipment
Prevented
Release
Unknown
Subtotal:
Totals:
Relative
Frequency:

All
Incidents

Rel.
Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown
Platform Releases

3

20%

3

1

0

0

0

2

13%

2

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

0
0
0

2
0
1

1
6

7%
0
0
0
40%
Subsea Releases
2
13%
1
0
2
2
13%
Subsea Equipment Releases
2
13%
0
0
0
1
7%
0
1
0
1
7%
0
0
0
4
27%
Unknown Release Point and No Fluids Released
1

7%

1

0

0

0

0

2
3
15

13%
20%
100%

0

0

0

0

2

7

3

2

2

6

35%

15%

10%

10%

30%

These data imply there is a greater likelihood of a subsea release from deepwater
incidents than from shallow water incidents. The ratio of platform or rig releases to subsea
releases for shallow water is 80% to 13%, for deepwater it is 40% to 40%. A contributing factor
is that much of the equipment located on the rig or platform for shallow water operations is being
relocated to the seafloor in deepwater operations, which has the potential of creating an even
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greater number of subsea releases. This risk could be somewhat mitigated however by the
expectation that the equipment being moved to the seafloor is being designed for long term, low
maintenance or maintenance free operations and is less likely to leak or fail than the simpler
surface equipment. The data supports this because the relative frequency of releases from surface
equipment which has been relocated subsea does not approach the relative frequency of releases
from these pieces of equipment when it was on the surface. For instance, the relative frequency
of surface BOP releases is 10.7% (8/75), but for subsea the number is 6.7% (1/15). For the
surface wellhead the number is 26.7% (20/75) and the subsea wellhead the number is 6.7%
(1/15). For the christmas tree on the surface the number is 5.3% (4/75), for subsea that number
is 0%. In any event, subsea wells are more likely to result in a subsea release point than a
surface well.
The actual subsea release points are known for only 6 of the deepwater incidents.
Nevertheless, each type of release point is represented in this small sample. This implies that the
capping stack system should ideally include the capability to handle subsea releases from all
possible flow paths and release points.
The data also implies that while shallow water operations did not encounter subsea
releases as often, deepwater operations will and a subsea response capability will be needed to
address these types of incidents.

4.4 Attachment Points
Once the release point is identified, the corresponding attachment point was defined as
the next upstream piece of equipment that was undamaged by the well control event, with the
assumption that the release point cannot be used as the attachment point. So for example, if the
fluids were released at the rotary table and the BOP is at the surface and was undamaged by the
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well control event the BOP would be the corresponding attachment point. If however, the BOP
was damaged by the well control event and that is noted in the incident description then the
corresponding attachment point would be the next upstream piece of equipment, in this case the
wellhead on the platform. In contrast, the release point itself might be an attachment point, e.g.
the top of the LMRP in the late stages of the Macondo incident. This possibility was not
considered in the results shown in tables below or in the spreadsheet.
Therefore the attachment points listed in the tables below represent the first, undamaged
piece of equipment where a barrier could be implemented, upstream of the release point. The
specific attachment points have been grouped by general location to simplify the presentation of
data. The general locations are on the rig or platform, subsea (below sea level but at or above the
seafloor), or inside the well below the seafloor. Also, the incidents without sufficient
information to determine an attachment point are listed as unknown. There is one incident where
no fluids were released to the environment, and therefore, attachment of a capping system was
irrelevant.
Table 4-7 shows that a little over 50% of the attachment points are on the rig or platform.
The subsea attachment points (20%) were most often associated with the wellbore flow path.
An attachment point below the sea floor would be required in 15% of the incidents. This is
significant because these types of incidents would require the capability for vertical intervention
with the well flowing, if that was possible. If vertical intervention was successful it would be
much quicker than drilling a relief well. The incidents in this data set include six incidents where
it was confirmed a relief well was begun soon after the blowout occurred and in three of those
incidents other operations (vertical intervention – 2, natural bridging – 1) were eventually used to
regain control of the well. This implies the capability for intervention during flow and under
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pressure would be desirable to minimize the time needed to regain control.
Table 4-7: Initial Attachment Point by Location and Flow Path (All Incidents)
Initial Attachment
Point:
BOP on Platform
Wellhead on
Platform
Tree on Platform
Chemical Injection
Manifold on
Platform
Subtotal:
Casing
Subsea BOP
Subtotal:

All
Rel.
Incidents Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown
Platform Attachment Points
23
26%
17
7
4
0
0
15

17%

7

4

5

0

0

11

12%

3

9

0

0

0

1

1%

0

0

0

0

1

6
0

0
0

1
0
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56%
Subsea Attachment Points
11
12%
6
0
7
8%
6
4
18
20%
Below Seafloor Attachment Points

Casing below sea
3
3%
1
0
2
0
floor
None Underground
4
4%
2
0
3
4
Blowout
None - Casing cut
3
3%
0
0
0
0
below sea floor
None - Mud
covering well at
2
2%
0
1
0
0
seafloor
None - Soil Boring
1
1%
1
0
0
0
Operation
Subtotal:
13
15%
Unknown Attachment Point and No Release of Fluids
Unknown
8
9%
1
1
0
0
Attachment Point
Equip Prevented
1
1%
1
0
0
0
Release
Subtotal:
9
10%
Totals:
90
100%
45
26
20
4
Relative
42%
24%
19%
4%
Frequency:

0
0
3
1
0

6
0
12
11%

The flow paths for these incidents are almost evenly divided among all possible flow
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paths except the string flow path. This has the potential to further complicate well control
responses and the specific capping stack capabilities required in these situations.
Finally, the data from the release points and from this section imply that the rig was intact
and accessible to the well control crews. This is important because there are more options to
control the well after the blowout. If the rig were lost as in Macondo the options for well control
are very limited.
A generally applicable capping stack system should be able to respond to all of these
scenarios: surface attachment, subsea attachment and attachment inside the well.
4.4.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations
The small numbers of incidents which have occurred in deepwater to date limit the
accuracy which the future expectations can be determined. Therefore, some general expectations
are discussed but no specific predictions are made.
The attachment points for responding to deepwater releases are expected to be
significantly different than for shallow water incidents. This is because the response equipment
for a release from a shelf operation can typically be attached at the BOP or wellhead on the
platform or rig. In contrast, the BOP, tree, or wellhead is typically on the seafloor in deepwater.
Although some deepwater developments like (i.e. TLP, spar) have a high pressure riser and a tree
at the surface, none of the incidents in this data set had a surface tree or BOP. In addition, a
deepwater drilling riser is not designed to handle shut-in pressures and would fail if some type of
capping stack were to be attached to it. Therefore, without a major change in technology to
strengthen the drilling riser in anticipation of a well control event, the majority of the deepwater
events will result in the need for a subsea attachment point. The drilling riser is present only
during drilling and therefore during production operations this limitation would not exist. The
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data shows that a subsea attachment point was from the string, wellbore, or less frequently the
annulus path in deepwater. The desirable attachment points for the deepwater capping stack
would be subsea equipment (LMRP, subsea BOP, tree), subsea wellhead, or the casing.
Table 4-8: Initial Attachment Point by Location and Flow Path (Deepwater
Incidents)
Deepwater Wells (>1,000 ft.)
Initial Attachment
Point:

All
Incidents

Subsea BOP
Umbilical
Termination Unit
Subtotal:

6
1
6

Rel
Freq Wellbore String Annulus
Subsea Attachment Points
40%
5
3
0
7%

0

0

0

Rock

Unknown

0

0

0

1

47%
Below Seafloor Attachment Points

Casing below sea
0
0%
0
0
0
0
floor
None Underground
2
13%
1
0
2
2
Blowout
None - Casing cut
2
13%
0
0
0
0
below sea floor
None - Mud
covering well at
0
0%
0
0
0
0
seafloor
None - Soil Boring
0
0%
0
0
0
0
Operation
Subtotal:
4
27%
Unknown Attachment Point and No Release of Fluids
Unk
3
20%
0
0
0
0
Equip Prevented
1
7%
1
0
0
0
Release
Subtotal:
4
27%
Totals:
15
100%
7
3
2
2
Relative
35%
15%
10%
10%
Frequency:

0
0
2
0
0

3
0
6
30%

An attachment point at the seafloor (40%) or below (27%) would be required for 67% of
the deepwater incidents, and none had attachment points on a platform or rig. This supports the
expectation that deepwater incidents will result in a much higher frequency of incidents requiring
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a subsea attachment point. Because of this, establishing a mechanical barrier to flow for
deepwater incidents is expected to be much more difficult than for shallow water wells. Four of
the deepwater incidents were from underground blowouts or from wells which had previously
been P&A’d. As a result, these would require an attachment point below the seafloor, which is
not straightforward. This is because there is no attachment for the vertical intervention
equipment. This implies the requirement for a relief well and a capping or containment system
while that relief well is drilled.

4.5 Barriers Used to Stop Formation Flow
The results from this section come from an analysis of the coding of the incident
description described in Chapter 3. The overall organization of the codes was to consider all of
the incidents as failures of barriers and to document attempts to reestablish barriers in the well.
As a result, the coding captures the types of barriers and how and where they were placed, as
well as how often they were successful.
A successful response to stop a blowout or leak requires establishing a barrier to
formation flow. As discussed in Chapter 2, the first barrier successfully established which
stopped flow is defined as the primary barrier. The second barrier is defined as, the barrier
which allowed the well to be returned to normal drilling or production operations or which
abandoned the well successfully.
Over 75% of the 90 incidents in this study included details on the primary barrier
established. Slightly more than 45% had information about both primary and secondary barriers.
A possible reason these numbers are so low is that the incident descriptions were more focused
on the cause of the incident, and the response to the incident was a secondary concern.
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4.5.1 Primary Barriers
An average of nearly four attempts was required to establish a primary barrier in shallow
water events. There were two general classes of barriers used in the past incidents, mechanical
and hydrostatic. Mechanical barriers included such things as BOP rams and annulars, valves,
cement plugs, packers and natural bridging events. This is in contrast to a hydrostatic barrier
which would involve pumping heavy mud or other fluid into the wellbore to reestablish a
hydrostatic overbalance. Specific methods include bullheading fluid into the well and
conventional kick circulation.
Sixty one or 86% of the incidents with barriers reported had a mechanical barrier as the
primary barrier. Ten incidents successfully used a hydrostatic barrier. Due to the low number of
incidents utilizing a hydrostatic barrier, a detailed discussion is not included here but the data is
provided in Appendix 1.
Table 4-9: Primary Mechanical Barrier by Location (All Incidents)
Location Where Barrier Was Installed (61 Incidents)
Primary Mechanical
Rig/
Subsea
Barrier
Platform BOP/ Rig/Platform
Rel.
Equipment/Method:
Wellbore
/Riser
LMRP
BOP
Total Freq.
Well Bridge
19
0
0
0
19
31%
BOP
0
0
5
10
15
25%
Surface Valves (Misc.)
0
11
0
0
11
18%
Subsurface Safety Valve
3
0
0
0
3
5%
Packer
2
0
0
0
2
3%
Cement Plug
2
0
0
0
2
3%
Diverter used to shut in
0
2
0
0
2
3%
Pumped LCM/Bridging
3
0
0
0
3
5%
Pill
Casing Swedge
0
1
0
0
1
2%
Emergency Shutdown
0
1
0
0
1
2%
Capping Stack
0
0
1
0
1
2%
Relief Well
1
0
0
0
1
2%
Totals:
30
15
6
10
Relative Frequency:
50%
25%
10%
16%
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Table 4-9 shows the number and relative frequency of each specific type of successful
barrier for the 61 incidents where the primary mechanical barrier was known.
The most frequent barrier (31% mechanical barriers) was a bridge, which occurred
naturally. The most common barrier implemented by the rig or platform crew was the use of a
BOP. The next most common barrier was a surface safety valve. These two intentional barriers
represent 43% of the mechanical barriers. It is interesting to note that these two barriers are in
place specifically for well control operations. This would imply the needs for well control
operations are well known and often implemented. For the BOP, two-thirds of the time the BOP
was located at the rig or platform and one-third it was located subsea. All the surface safety
valves were located on the rig or platform. The most frequent location of the barrier when it was
installed is the wellbore, the second is the rig or platform or riser. If the well bridging incidents
are removed from consideration, the rig or platform or riser and rig or platform BOP are the most
frequent followed by the wellbore and then subsea.
4.5.1.1 Implications for Deepwater
The deepwater incidents provide a different perspective on barriers (Table 4-10). There
were no occurrences of natural bridging. Instead the most frequent successful mechanical barrier
was a subsea BOP.
Only one of the deepwater incidents used a hydrostatic barrier as the primary barrier. A
packer (set in the wellbore) and the Macondo capping stack were the only other equipment used
so far in deepwater to establish a primary mechanical barrier.
The lack of natural bridging so far in deepwater may be partially explained by the narrow
margins between fracture gradient and pore pressure in the deepwater GOM. This results in
casing being set at shorter depth intervals and as a result there is a shorter length of open hole
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exposed and able to create a natural bridge. Although natural bridging is not well understood,
the only conclusion reached here will be that there have not been any events of natural bridging
to date in deepwater.
Table 4-10: Primary Mechanical Barrier by Location (Deepwater Incidents)
Location Where Barrier Was Installed (8 Incidents)
Primary Mechanical
Rig/
Subsea
Barrier
Platform BOP/
Rig/Platform
Rel.
Equipment/Method:
Wellbore /Riser
LMRP BOP
Total Freq.
Well Bridge
0
0
0
0
0
0%
BOP
0
0
6
0
6
75%
Surface Valves (Misc.)
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Subsurface Safety Valve
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Packer
1
0
0
0
1
13%
Cement Plug
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Diverter used to shut in
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Pumped LCM/Bridging
Pill
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Casing Swedge
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Emergency Shutdown
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Capping Stack
0
0
1
0
1
13%
Relief Well
0
0
0
0
0
0%
Totals:
1
0
7
0
Relative Frequency:
12%
0%
88%
0%

An average of just over three attempts was required to establish a primary barrier for
deepwater incidents. This implies that deepwater operations require fewer failed attempts to stop
flow than shelf operations. The reasons are not so obvious. It may be because it was possible to
achieve a barrier using the existing subsea BOP in five of the eight deepwater incidents. It may
also be that the deepwater reports are less detailed or than the increased difficulty in deepwater
results in fewer, more carefully planned attempts. It is notable that this average was biased
upwards by 1.70 attempts due to the relatively large number of documented unsuccessful
attempts in the Macondo incident, but that the average was still only three attempts.
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Table 4-10 shows the eight successful mechanical barriers placed in deepwater incidents
versus the location (effectively the same as the expected attachment point described earlier)
where that barrier was placed. In seven of the eight incidents the barrier used most was the
subsea BOP. This implies the ability to shut-in deepwater wells with subsea well control
equipment is of critical importance.
Macondo represents an important variation in that the subsea BOP was ineffective, but
the successful capping stack was attached to the LMRP on top of the subsea BOP (i.e. the
attachment point was actually downstream rather than upstream of the failed BOP. This was
possible because there were no leaks from the BOP or the LMRP.
4.5.1.2 Other Implications for Deepwater Response Systems
A brief discussion about the importance of the rig or platform remaining intact during an
incident is pertinent. There were four incidents where the rig or platform was lost. Three
incidents were a result of a hurricane toppling the structure and the fourth was Macondo. The
three hurricane incidents were in shallow water. Macondo was a deepwater operation being
conducted by a semi-submersible rig with a subsea BOP. A subsea BOP and other subsea
drilling equipment are generally controlled by a control cable or umbilical attached to the drilling
riser. In the event of a loss of the rig, ROV’s are available; however, it takes time to deploy
them. As Macondo showed, the capability of the ROV’s to control the subsea equipment is
limited. The low pressure drilling riser used with floating rigs, such as semi-submersibles,
precludes installing a mechanical barrier in the riser. Therefore, mechanical barriers can only be
installed on, within, or by replacing the rig equipment at the sea floor. This suggests that it is
highly desirable that the controls for the subsea equipment remain intact during and after an
incident. Currently, this means the rig or platform and control lines, umbilical, and riser must
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remain intact. The current capping stack designs require the riser and all control lines to be
removed before the stack can be installed. Therefore, the capability of retaining control of the
subsea equipment should ideally be incorporated into the capping stack system. Since no
equipment is currently available to perform this function, it is suggested that future research
investigate a more effective and more fully functional means of controlling subsea equipment
from the surface without the need for the rig or platform to remain attached to the well. A means
to retain full control for existing subsea equipment and any capping stack system from the
surface would be an important capability.
4.5.2 Secondary Barriers
Just over half of the incident reports did not provide information on the secondary barrier
used. For the cases with documentation, 63% used mechanical barriers and 37% placed fluid
into the well was used to establish a hydrostatic barrier.
Table 4-11: Secondary Mechanical Barrier by Location When Installed (All
Incidents)
Location of Barrier When Installed (26 Incidents)
Secondary Mechanical
Rig/
Subsea
Barrier
Platform BOP/
Rig/Platform
Rel.
Equipment/Method:
Wellbore /Riser
LMRP BOP
Total Freq.
Cement Plug
18
0
0
0
18
67%
BOP
0
0
1
0
1
4%
Blind Flange
0
1
0
1
2
8%
Valve
0
2
0
0
2
8%
Packer
1
0
0
0
1
4%
Well Bridge
1
0
0
0
1
4%
TIW Valve
0
2
0
0
2
8%
Totals:
20
5
1
1
Relative Frequency:
74%
15%
4%
7%

The average number of attempts to establish a secondary barrier was less than two for
shallow water events. The meaning of this is that the first attempt after establishing the primary
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barrier was more often successful in establishing the secondary barrier, regardless of how
difficult it was to establish the primary barrier. For 27 of the 35 shallow water events (with
secondary barrier information) the first attempt to establish the secondary barrier was successful.
Table 4-11 shows the methods used to establish secondary barriers. They are very
different than for the primary barriers. This makes sense since the barrier does not need to be
established against flow. A cement plug is used as a secondary barrier 67% of the time. This is
telling as this would indicate the well is going to be abandoned or sidetracked or plugged back.
This implies that in 18 of the 90 incidents significant time and expense was incurred as a direct
result of the blowout or leak.
In Table 4-11 the secondary barrier is generally located inside the well. This makes sense
as typically the well can be reentered and a barrier placed with much less difficulty once the
primary barrier is established and placement closer to the formation provides a more secure
barrier. Of note is the incident where the BOP was the secondary barrier, in this incident the
LMRP was disconnected by mistake and the BOP could not be operated. A packer was in the
well and able to be placed and set, which provided the primary barrier.
4.5.2.1 Secondary Hydrostatic Barriers
Hydrostatic barriers make up a greater percentage of the secondary barriers. The 16
incidents with hydrostatic secondary barriers are shown in Table 4-12.
The reason the fluid type was categorized was because the method of circulating the fluid
was not reliably captured by the incident description. In most cases the information given was
limited to the fact that the fluid was circulated to kill the well. Also of interest is that the
incidents with secondary barrier information only included P&A operations and drilling,
workover, and completion operations. A possible explanation is there are fewer production
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incidents and therefore a smaller possibility that one of those incidents would include secondary
barrier information. An alternative explanation is that the incident description of production
operations implies a secondary barrier which is not stated, for example surface safety valves or
other valves on the tree that would routinely be installed, repaired or reinstalled fulfilling the
function of a secondary barrier.
Table 4-12: Secondary Hydrostatic Barrier by Location and Operation in Progress
(All Incidents)
Secondary Hydrostatic
Barrier:
Pumped Heavy Mud
Pumped Completion
Fluid
Pumped Seawater
Subtotal:
Relative Frequency:
Pumped Heavy Mud
Pumped Completion
Fluid
Pumped Seawater
Subtotal:
Relative Frequency:

Rig/
Subsea
Platform BOP/
Wellbore /Riser
LMRP
All Incidents
8
1
0
4
2
14
88%
4
1
0
5
100%

1
0
0
0
2
0
12%
0%
Deepwater Incidents
0
0
0
0
0
0%

0
0
0
0%

Rig/Platform
BOP
Total

Rel.
Freq.

0

9

56%

0
0
0
0%

5
2

31%
13%

0

4

80%

0
0
0
0%

1
0

20%
0%

4.5.3 Implications for Deepwater
A hydrostatic balance was used as a secondary barrier in five of the eight documented
deepwater incidents. In four the secondary barrier was established by circulating kill weight
mud, and one was affected using completion fluid. Two incidents used a cement plug and one
used the BOP as mechanical secondary barriers.
An average of just over three attempts was required to establish the secondary barrier.
These attempts were apparently also more time consuming than for shelf operations. This makes
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sense if the complexity of the deepwater operations is taken into consideration. This complexity
adds an additional layer of difficulty in deepwater operations after a blowout. The exact status of
each component of the system may not be known. The complexity of deepwater operations is
not likely to change, however, as more experience with deepwater systems is gained, there
should be a greater understanding of what fails, and how it fails, which should lead to more
effective responses.
In seven of the eight deepwater incidents the secondary barrier was placed within the
well. This implies that gaining access to the wellbore will be required for the majority of
deepwater incidents. For a generally applicable capping stack system this means it should have
the capability to enter the well to place these secondary barriers.

4.6 Initial Response: Shut-in versus Capture versus Divert
The prior section focused on the methods used to establish a barrier to stop or prevent
flow. Several attempts were often required before a success was achieved. This section captures
if any attempts were made to shut-in, capture or divert flow. These were sometimes an initial
response needed before being able to implement a primary barrier.
4.6.1 Shut-in
The data from this section comes from two separate analyses of the data. The first
analysis determined whether shut-in was attempted. The second analysis used the incident
description coding. The codes were examined to answer the following questions; was shut in
attempted with any equipment at any time, was shut in attempted with the BOP, how many
attempts were made to close the BOP, was the BOP the primary or secondary barrier, and was
any method of shut in (other than bridging) successful in establishing a primary barrier. The two
different analyses were correlated so the results matched.
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Attempts were made to shut-in the well in 63 of the 90 incidents. As shown in Table
4-13, attempts were made using the BOP in 30 incidents. There were 15 successful shut-ins
using a BOP. This means that the BOP was successful in shutting in the well for only 50% of
the attempts. There were 33 attempts made using something other than the BOP.

In these

incidents some equipment or method other than the BOP was used to shut-in the well. The
equipment and methods used include packers, valves, relief wells, emergency shutdown systems,
diverter systems used to shut-in the well, drill string safety valves, and cement plugs. These
methods were successful in 79% (26/33 incidents) of the incidents where they were attempted
(see Table 4-13). This list does not include well bridging, which is considered a passive barrier.
Overall, 40 out of the 63 total shut-in attempts or 63% of the time the attempt was successful.
Table 4-13: Shut-in Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents)
Shut-in
Attempts - BOP
Attempts – Other
Total Attempts
Not Attempted
Attempts Unknown

Attempted
30
33

Rel.
Freq.
33%
37%

63
11
16

70%
12%
18%

Successful
16
26

Success Freq.
53%
79%

40

63%

The average number of attempts made to close the BOP when the BOP was used
successfully to shut-in the well was nearly 3 attempts. However, for the cases where the BOP
was never successful in shutting in the well, an average of less than two attempts was made.
This leads to the question of whether the crew gave up too quickly, if the conditions were too
hazardous to continue attempting to shut-in the well, or if there were only one or two practical
alternatives for using the BOP. Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but
would be relevant for future work.
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The wellbore and/or string flow path had a total of 57 incidents; these incidents used the
BOP to shut-in 37% of the time, and other equipment 40% of the time. The annular flow path
had 17 incidents; the BOP was used 41% of the time, and other equipment 47% of the time. The
rock (underground) flow path had 4 incidents and 50% of the time the BOP was used and 50% of
the time other equipment was used. The relevant question for this data would be if the shut-in
caused an underground blowout, and unfortunately the data does not contain sufficient detail to
draw any conclusions. It is also unknown if the flow path was known when the decision to shutin the well was made, this would also have been useful information to have.
4.6.1.1 Implications for Deepwater
The trends seen in initial responses to blowouts in deepwater are somewhat different (see
Table 4-14). Shut-in was attempted in only 9 of the 15 deepwater incidents. There were 7
successful shut-ins for a 77% success rate. This rate is greater than for shallow water operations
where shut-in was attempted.
Table 4-14: Shut-in Attempts and Success Frequency (Deepwater Incidents)

Shut-in
Attempts – BOP
Attempts – Other
Total Attempts
Not Attempted
Attempts Unknown

Rel.
Attempted Freq. Successful
8
53%
6
1
7%
1
9
60%
7
0
0%
6
40%

Success Freq.
75%
100%
78%

A possible reason for this difference is that a subsea BOP has more functionality and
redundancy built into the design than a surface BOP. Another reason could be the higher
frequency of incidents where it is unknown whether there was an attempt to shut-in.
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Additionally, the wide varieties of incidents which have occurred in shallow water have not been
seen yet in deepwater. It is uncertain whether the higher success rates in deepwater is significant
and likely to continue or whether it is an anomaly.
4.6.2 Capture
Table 4-15 shows there were only four incidents where flow was captured. Three of
these attempts to capture flow occurred after a hurricane damaged the platform. These incidents
are typically low flow events, and a portion of the flow was captured using a small pollution
dome. One incident was Macondo, where intermittent attempts were successful in capturing a
portion of the significantly larger flow rates.
Table 4-15: Capture Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents)

Capture
Captured Some or All of Flow
Not Attempted
Attempts Unknown

Partial
Rel.
Capture
Attempted Freq. Successful
4
4%
4
71
79%
15
17%

Partial
Capture
Success
Freq.
100%

4.6.2.1 Implications for Deepwater
As shown in Table 4-16, the only deepwater incident where capture was used was
Macondo. One incident is not adequate for defining future expectations, however the experience
gained from Macondo and the solution for capturing high pressure, high flow rates is particularly
relevant to this study. While the solution employed by BP was not 100% successful, the device
was able to capture some of the flow and minimize pollution. Therefore, the capability to
capture high pressure, high flow rates subsea is critically important for a subsea capping stack.
While specific modifications to the device used by BP are not indicated by the data in this study,
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it is logical that to minimize pollution from future incidents modifications should be made to
allow more of the flow to be captured.
Table 4-16: Capture Attempts and Success Frequency (Deepwater Incidents)

Capture
Captured Some or All of Flow
Not Attempted
Attempts Unknown

Partial
Rel.
Capture
Attempted Freq. Successful
1
7%
1
8
53%
6
40%

Partial
Capture
Success
Freq.
100%

4.6.3 Divert
Flow was diverted in 21 incidents with standard diverter systems (see Table 4-17). In
eight additional events, flow was diverted with something other than a standard diverter system.
Table 4-17: Divert Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents)

Rel.
Divert
Attempted Freq. Successful
Shallow Water Incidents
Attempts - Std. Diverter Sys.
17
23%
16
Attempts – Other
7
9%
2
Total Attempts
24
32%
18
Not Attempted
42
56%
Attempts Unknown
9
12%
Deepwater Incidents
Attempts - Std. Diverter Sys.
4
26%
3
Attempts – Other
1
7%
1
Total Attempts
5
33%
4
Not Attempted
4
27%
Attempts Unknown
6
40%

Success
Freq.
94%
29%
75%

75%
100%
80%

These eight incidents applied non-standard methods during the incident, mostly in an effort to
reduce the risk to the personnel attempting to control the well. In 15 incidents, it is unknown if
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flow was diverted (i.e. there was not enough detail from the incident description to determine
what, if anything was used)
4.6.3.1 Implications for Deepwater
Five of the 15 (33%) deepwater incidents resulted in diverted flow successfully, whereas
24 (32%) of shallow water incidents resulted in successfully diverting flow. This frequency of
diverting flow is similar to the shallow water events and may not represent a statistically
significant difference. However, the inability to shut-in the well at the surface due to the subsea
BOP and low pressure riser used with deepwater operations may present an increased risk to the
personnel during deepwater operations, and the only option possible is to divert flow away from
the rig or to evacuate the rig. Evacuation leaves the well blowing out with the rig completely
unmanned and unmonitored. Therefore, diverting flow is typically preferable. This situation is
likely to continue in deepwater drilling operations so a higher frequency of deepwater diverting
events is likely to occur. The actual equipment that was used for diverting is less clear. There
were four deepwater incidents where the standard diverting system was used, and one event
where a non-standard diverter was used (diversion when the riser was inadvertently
disconnected). Macondo was one incident where diverting was used and the results were an
explosion, a fire and finally the loss of the rig. These were a result of equipment being unable to
handle the gas flows. This indicates that diverting flow through the mud gas separator (as in
Macondo) has the potential to cause problems that may lead to the loss of the rig. This is
something that should be avoided at all costs.
4.6.4 Summary and Conclusions for Initial Response: Shut-in versus Capture versus
Divert
Shut-ins were attempted in 63 incidents, whereas capture was attempted in only four, and
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diverting was attempted in 28 incidents. Therefore historically, shut-in was used to control flow,
but it was not always successful. Diverting flow is the response that is used to reduce the risk to
personnel and allow for subsequent well control efforts. However, it is generally ineffective in
limiting pollution. Currently the goal of diverting flow is not to limit pollution, but to reduce the
danger to personnel so they can get the flow of formation fluids stopped in a shorter period of
time. The goal of shut-in is to stop the flow of formation fluids immediately. In deepwater
operations however, due to restrictions as a result of subsea BOP’s and low pressure drilling
risers, shut-in at the surface is no longer an option. This therefore implies, the goal of diverting
flow in deepwater could be expanded to include capturing flow. This would have the effect of
reducing the risk to personnel as well as preventing pollution.

4.7 Vertical Intervention
Vertical intervention is any reentry into the well during a blowout or blowout response in
an attempt to reestablish control of the well. These techniques have been used on land wells for
a long time with success. Only eight of the 90 incidents used vertical intervention in an attempt
to control the well (See Table 4-18). Four attempts were made to set a packer, barite pill, or
cement plugs to establish a barrier (See Table 4-19). In one case, vertical intervention was
stopped because the area was too hazardous to allow operations to continue and the well was
ultimately controlled by relief well operations. Coil tubing units or snubbing units are often used
in the offshore environment for workovers, and can also be used in well control efforts. Only
three incidents in the past 15 years used either a coil tubing unit or snubbing unit for vertical
intervention. Fourteen incidents do not contain sufficient detail to determine if vertical
intervention was attempted. Sixty eight incidents did not use any type of vertical intervention as
an attempt to control the well (see Table 4-18).
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The most frequent flow path when vertical intervention was used was the wellbore flow
path (see Table 4-20). This is reasonable since the wellbore path is the most frequent flow path
overall.
Table 4-18: Vertical Intervention Attempts (All Incidents)
Vertical Intervention:
Vertical Intervention – Yes
Unknown vertical intervention
No vertical intervention

All Events
8
14
68

Rel Freq
8.89%
15.56%
75.56%

Table 4-19: Vertical Intervention Method and Success Frequency (All Incidents)

All
Incidents

Rel
Freq

Successful
(Primary or
Secondary
Barrier)?

Spotted Pill

1

12.50%

1

Coil Tubing Unit

1

12.50%

1

Snubbing Unit

2

25.00%

2

Cement Plug

3

37.50%

3

100%
100%
100%
100%

Unknown VI Type

1

12.50%

0

0%

Vertical
Intervention
Method

Success
Freq.

Comments

Relief Well Was
Successful

Table 4-20: Vertical Intervention Method by Flow Path (All Incidents)

Vertical
Intervention
Method

Wellbore String Annulus

Rock

Spotted Pill

1

0

0

0

Coil Tubing Unit

1

0

0

0

Snubbing Unit

2

1

0

0

Cement Plug

0

1

2

1

Unknown Method

0

0

1

0
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Comments

One had String and Wellbore
Flow Paths
One had Annulus and Rock
Flow Paths

The annulus flow path is the next most frequent flow path and the least common was the
rock/underground blowout flow path. It is of note that cement plugs were useful across the
widest variety of flow paths.
The ability to conduct vertical intervention in the case of the incident with the rock flow
path, i.e. underground blowout was particularly significant. It allowed a logical well informed
response to an incident that could very easily have become worse than Macondo. The response
included logging to determine where the subsurface flows were occurring and setting cement
plugs to prevent those flows. When additional rock flow paths were discovered, additional
logging was conducted, and an additional cement plug was placed to prevent any further flows.
This incident prevented a major hydrocarbon release, drilling fluid was released to the seafloor
but this incident should properly be classified as a “near miss” rather than a blowout.
Nevertheless, it was a significant incident in that the actions of the crew were able to overcome
the threat of a major release.
This information leads to the conclusion that while vertical intervention is not used very
often it is something that should be considered as a necessary capability within a capping stack
system. A vertical intervention capability that facilitates setting packers, cement plugs or
running coil tubing clearly has potential applications, especially when the flow path is outside
the wellbore.
4.7.1 Implications for Deepwater
Only one of the 15 deepwater incidents was addressed with vertical intervention (Table
4-21). A cement plug was set in that case to establish the secondary barrier. With only one
incident, the implications that can be drawn for deepwater are limited.
One possible reason why the number of vertical intervention attempts is so low in this
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data set is because the incidents which used vertical intervention successfully were not incidents
which resulted in any fluid spilled to the environment. Therefore, the conclusions about the use
of vertical intervention from simply the use or lack of use of vertical intervention in this data set
are limited. However, other analyses included in this chapter suggest that the need for vertical
intervention is a capability that should be considered necessary for a subsea capping stack
system.
Table 4-21: Vertical Intervention and Successes by Flow Path (Deepwater Incidents)

Vertical
Intervention
All
Method
Incidents
1

Rel
Freq

Successful
(Primary
or
Secondary
Barrier)?

Annulus

Rock

13%

1

1

1

Cement Plug

Comments
One had Annulus
and Rock Flow
Paths

4.8 Factors Affecting the Success or Failure of the Well Control Response
An examination of the factors affecting the success or failure of the well control response
in these incidents was not as useful as originally expected. However, some factors were
identified that influenced the severity of these incidents.
Macondo was the only incident that caused substantial environmental damage and was
one of only two incidents with fatalities. There were four incidents which resulted in the loss of
the rig. There were no multi-well incidents during this period. In five incidents, it was identified
that other wells that might have become involved were successfully shut-in. The emergency
shutdown procedure may have also been used to shut-in adjacent wells in other incidents, but this
level of detail was not in the incident description. In any event, the ability to successfully shut-in
adjacent wells has prevented at least one incident of multiple wells releasing hydrocarbons to the
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environment.
The following statistics are based on information provided to BSEE by the operators
regarding the type of fluids released and any resulting fire and explosion on the rig or platform.
The type of hydrocarbon released was also relevant, gas flow to the surface was common (40%)
in the incidents involved in this study. Of these 36 incidents, seven of the incidents had a
resulting fire, explosion, injury, fatality or loss of the rig. This results in a relative frequency of
these types of incidents of 19%. Of the 54 incidents with oil flows, there were only three
incidents with a resulting fire, explosion, injury, fatality or loss of the rig. The relative frequency
of these types of incidents is 6%. Flows that are predominantly gas cause little pollution relative
to an equivalent oil spill or blowout. This implies that while gas flows result in little or no
pollution, the risk to personnel and equipment is higher.
Another important conclusion is that the use of storm packers and SCSSV’s on offshore
wells has had a major impact in preventing more severe spills and pollution as a result of
hurricane events. Of the 95 incidents where a hurricane toppled rigs or platforms, only five
incidents were included in this study because the other 90 did not release any formation fluids.
4.8.1 Implications for Deepwater
Gas in the riser of a deepwater floating rig creates a particularly dangerous situation
relative to the presence of gas in a well with a surface wellhead and BOP. Three incidents in this
study involved gas in the riser of a floating rig. In two instances, the gas was successfully
circulated out of the riser without any damage to the riser or rig. Macondo, where gas in the riser
was released at the surface and contributed to the initial fire and explosion was an extreme
example of this danger. It is expected that the risk of having gas in a drilling riser will continue
to be an especially dangerous hazard associated with current deepwater drilling techniques.
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4.8.2 Summary
The primary factors contributing to the limited number of incidents with severe impacts
were 1) most flows were oil and not gas which minimized the explosion and ignition risk, 2)
there were no multi-well releases of hydrocarbons, apparently because of emergency shutdown
of adjacent wells was effective, and 3) the requirement for SCSSV’s in offshore producing wells
prevented flow from a number of wells whose surface trees and wellheads were damaged or
compromised.
The presence of gas in the drilling riser contributed to the loss of well control and to the
severity of the Macondo incident. The risk of gas entering the drilling riser during a well control
event is a concern in all floating drilling operations that is not an issue when using a surface
wellhead and BOP because of the increased risk of gas being released on the rig. The drilling
riser is not intended to contain a gas flow and generally cannot be closed at the surface to prevent
a release of gas; the mud gas separator cannot handle large gas flows either. Although, a diverter
system is available on floating rigs and is the only defense against gas flows on the rig, it is not
designed to handle high rates and high pressures.

72

5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary goal of this study was to develop an understanding of incidents reported to
BSEE over the past 15 years to help define the capabilities which should be included in an
effective, generally applicable, subsea capping stack system. The purpose of an effective
capping stack system is to minimize the time needed to regain control of a blowout and minimize
the volume of hydrocarbons released. This was accomplished by focusing the analysis of the
data on nine topics: operation in progress, flow path, release points, possible attachment points,
barriers used to stop formation flow, vertical intervention, and factors which increased or
reduced the severity of the pollution and reduced the time to stop the flow of formation fluids.
Additionally, analysis was conducted to determine how the incidents would have been different
had they occurred in deepwater. A total of nine individual tasks were completed to meet these
objectives.
An additional goal was to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on
offshore blowouts for use in future research to improve the understanding of, responses to, and
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills.
What follows is a description of the most critical findings of this study and how these
findings meet the goals and objectives of this study.
There is a limitation to these findings. The total number of incidents in deepwater was 15
of which 10 involved subsea operations. The use of subsea BOPs, and wellheads are limited to
these types of operations. Since the number of incidents is so small relative to the total number
of incidents, all findings relating to these types of incidents should be considered preliminary and
will need to be re-evaluated as additional incidents occur.
Additionally, some findings of this study do not relate specifically to the objectives or
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goals but were significant and important, these are included as well. Finally, any findings which
resulted in a need for future research were identified and described.

5.1 Type of Incidents in Deepwater and Resulting Response Capabilities
5.1.1.1 Operation in Progress
Drilling, completion, and workover operations were the most frequent the operation in
progress when an incident occurred (66%). However, incidents occurred during all phases of the
life of a well. The trends for deepwater were very similar to the trends in shallow water.
Therefore, deepwater incidents can occur at any point in the life of a well. The capping stack
system should be capable of responding to incidents during all phases of operation in the life of a
well.
5.1.2

Flow Paths

The wellbore and string are the most common (66%) flow paths for spills and blowouts.
However, the annulus (19%) and rock flow (4%) paths result in additional complications for
achieving an effective response. Also, rock flow paths are likely to be underreported because
any underground blowouts which did not result in a release of fluids would not be included in
this data set. The ability to regain control of any incident involving an annulus or rock flow path
would require either a relief well or vertical intervention in order to regain control of the well.
5.1.3

Release Points

The frequency of subsea release points increases dramatically in deepwater incidents.
The ratio of subsea to surface releases in shallow water is 5% : 88% while in deepwater this ratio
is 40% : 40%. An increase in subsea releases results in an increased need for deepwater subsea
response capabilities. Subsea releases in deepwater will likely be high flow rate and high
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pressure. Therefore, any effective subsea capping stack should have the capability to capture
subsea flows from all subsea equipment which would minimize pollution while other well
control operations are ongoing. This could be similar to the one used at Macondo.
Release points from vents at the seafloor are rock flow paths and as such would require
either vertical intervention or a relief well to regain control.
5.1.4

Attachment Points

The attachment point task resulted in several findings of relevance. In deepwater the
attachment points are typically (47%) the subsea equipment (LMRP, BOP, subsea wellhead or
tree). However 27% of the attachment points are below the seafloor. These types of incidents
would typically require a relief well or vertical intervention. However, to limit pollution a
capture or containment capability would be needed while the relief well is being drilled. Or,
vertical intervention could be used to regain control of the well more quickly which would limit
the amount of pollution and reduce the time needed to regain control as compared to a relief
well.
The attachment points for deepwater operations are restricted to subsea equipment due to
the low pressure drilling riser.
5.1.5

Methods to Stop or Control Flow

The most frequent primary barriers were mechanical (75%) in deepwater. The most
common barrier for drilling operations in deepwater was the subsea BOP, a device designed for
well control operations. This implies the need to duplicate the functions of the BOP, in a
standalone piece of equipment.
Barriers sometimes had to be placed within the wellbore (12%). Eighty-eight percent of
the time the secondary barrier was placed in the well. Therefore, the capability for vertical
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intervention for these types of incidents would be required.
Additionally, it was concluded that any equipment which duplicates the subsea BOP
capability should be able to be controlled from the surface. While this is not directly supported
by any one finding, several findings support this conclusion, including duplicating the
functionality of the BOP, the fact that the BOP and other production well control equipment was
often used to establish a primary barrier. While not supported by the findings, common sense
would dictate that if the installation of a capping stack system removes well control functionality
during a crisis situation that system is unlikely to be used.
5.1.6

Shut-In

In deepwater shut-in was attempted at least 60% of the time and potentially, 100% of the
time if the unknown incidents did in fact attempt shut-in. Also, the success rate for shut-in was
89%. This suggests that shut-in is an important response capability.
5.1.7

Capture

Capture of formation fluids was used in deepwater in an attempt to mitigate pollution
damage while other operations were ongoing to permanently stop the flow of formation fluids.
This implies that this capability is required for future deepwater operations. Additionally,
several task findings support the capability for capture and containment capability. Some
incidents in the past 15 years would have required a relief well to be drilled as the only practical
solution had these incidents occurred in deepwater. Therefore, in order to mitigate the pollution
from these types of incidents, capture and containment would be required. Finally, in a small but
significant percentage of past incidents the only possible attachment point was below the
seafloor. It would take time to implement this type of solution therefore mitigating pollution
while those operations are ongoing would be a critical capability.
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5.1.8

Vertical Intervention

While vertical intervention was used less than 10% of these incidents the success rate is
nearly 90%. Although the use has been minimal in the past, several types of incidents which
occurred in shallow water would require vertical intervention had they occurred in deepwater,
and justify the inclusion of vertical intervention capability in future responses. These include
annulus and rock flow paths, subsea releases, or attachment points below the sea floor.
Therefore vertical intervention is considered an important capability for an effective subsea
capping stack.

5.2 Types of Incidents in Shallow Water and Resulting Response Capabilities
For shallow water incidents, the findings support several general conclusions which are
not specifically related to the capabilities of a subsea capping stack. In 80% of the incidents the
release point was at the surface. Shallow incidents used well control equipment to successfully
stop the flow of formation fluids in 70% of the incidents. In shallow water the primary barrier to
flow was placed at the surface most often, possibly because this is the easiest place to install the
barrier. The rig was used in 97% of the incidents to place the primary barrier. The only incident
where it wasn’t used a relief well was used to regain control.

5.3 Useful Capabilities for a Subsea Capping Stack
A generally applicable subsea capping stack system should include the following
operational requirements for effectively responding to deepwater Gulf of Mexico incidents:
1.

Ability to respond to incidents at any time in the life of a well.

2.

Ability to shut-in the well

3.

Ability to attach to subsea equipment

4.

Ability to mitigate pollution by capturing or containing the flow of formation fluids while
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other operations are ongoing to stop the flow.
5.

Ability to install barriers in the wellbore (i.e. vertical intervention).

6.

Ability to maintain control of subsea equipment during application.

5.4 Additional Observations and Conclusions
There were several conclusions which resulted from the analysis of the data that are
important, but not directly related to an effective capping stack system.
1.

The combination of storm packers and/or surface controlled subsurface safety valves
prevented unintended formation flows after a hurricane over 90% of the time.

2.

Although not directly supported by the data, the implication from the incidents in this
study is that the greatest opportunity for regaining control after a blowout exists when the
integrity of the rig or platform remains intact.

3.

Well bridging should not be considered a likely barrier in future deepwater incidents.

4.

Deepwater well control operations are more complex than shallow water operations,
resulting in increased time needed to control blowouts.

5.

Low flow, low pressure incidents have used pollution domes to successfully mitigate
pollution damage.

6.

Most often shallow water incidents had release points at the surface.

7.

Most often shallow water incidents placed the primary barrier at the rig or platform.

8.

Gas in the riser which is a hazard specific to deepwater was identified.

9.

Gas flows increase the risk of fire, explosion, injury, fatalities, and loss of the rig.

10.

Knowledgeable personnel on site during incidents were able to significantly reduce the
severity of two incidents in the past 15 years.

11.

In the 90 incidents included in this study, only two resulted in fatalities.
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5.5 Creation of a Searchable, Sortable Spreadsheet
The secondary goal of this study was to create a spreadsheet which is searchable and
sortable. Significant time was spent determining how best to structure the spreadsheet so that
future studies could be conducted using the same data. The power and flexibility of the coding
for the incident description captures a large amount of information that is searchable and can be
sorted. The correlations between multiple task groupings (i.e. flow path by operation by
attachment point) demonstrated the successful use of the spreadsheet to answer questions relating
to multiple critical factors. It is expected and intended that this basic spreadsheet will be the
basis for future studies on well control incidents in the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore, the goal of
creating a searchable and sortable spreadsheet of incidents in the Gulf of Mexico during the past
15 years has been accomplished.

5.6 Recommendations for Future Work
1. A study, using the spreadsheet created from this study, should be conducted to determine
if there is a sequence of events which leads to successful well control operations.
2. An examination of diverter system design should be conducted to determine if they can
be modified to handle higher pressures and flow rates for longer periods of time
to allow safe well control operations on deepwater floating rigs.
3. A feasibility study should be conducted to determine if the capability for subsea diversion
should be incorporated into subsea BOP equipment for normal drilling operations.
4. A detailed examination of the bridging phenomenon to determine if it will ever occur in
deepwater should be conducted.
5. In deepwater drilling operations the low pressure riser limits options for well control. An
engineering study examining potential ways to overcome these limits should be
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conducted.
6. A study should be completed to determine how best to control subsea equipment
including the subsea capping stack system from the surface in the event the rig is lost,
structurally damaged, or inaccessible due to fire or other hazards.
7. The capabilities needed to respond to blowouts from multiple wells at a single location
simultaneously, especially in deepwater, should be explored.

5.7 Final Thoughts
A generally applicable effective subsea capping stack system needs to incorporate the
following capabilities; control of intact subsea equipment, vertical intervention, and additional
capture and containment equipment. The system should be designed to handle blowouts during
the entire life cycle of a well. Although deepwater blowouts are going to continue, the response
capabilities of the industry will be improved with the addition of a generally applicable subsea
capping stack system.
Other important findings were that SCSSV’s have been extremely successful at
preventing blowouts after hurricanes, the loss of a rig or platform severely limits well control
options, well bridging has not yet occurred in deepwater, and finally, deepwater wells result in
more complex well control operations.
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF INCIDENT DESCRIPTION CODES
Location along flow path (Drilling):
1) Well
1a) Drill pipe/work string/tubing
1b) Cased Annulus (no cement)
1c) Cased Annulus (through cement)
1d) Inside structural casing/drive pipe
1e) Outside the well
1f) Inside Casing
1g) Open Hole
2) Wellhead housing
3) BOP
3a) Main Bore
3b) Choke/Kill/Booster Lines
3c) Control Pods
3d) Other
4) Lower Marine Riser Package
5) Drilling Riser
6) Surface Drilling Equipment
6CS - Surface Capping Stack
6 BOP) Surface BOP/ Stripper rubber(coil
tubing)
6 W) Surface Wellhead
6 D) Diverter
6 M) Mud pits
6 MP) Mud pump
6 DRK) Surface Derrick
7) Ocean/ Atmosphere
Location along flow path (Production):
1) Well
1a) Tubing
1b) Cased Annulus
1c) Inside structural casing/drive pipe
1d) Outside the well
1e) SCSSV control lines
1f) P&A Cement Plug
2) Wellhead housing
3) Tubing Hanger Spool
4) Tree

4a) Production Path (Tubing)
4b) Annulus Path (Monitor/Injection)
4c) Control Lines
4d) Other
5) Jumper
6) Subsea Manifold
7) Flowline
8) Production Riser
9) Production Equipment
9 W) Surface Wellhead
9 XT) Surface Tree
9a) Production Pipeline
10) Controls/Pod
11) Umbilical
12) Ocean/ Atmosphere
Type of Barrier
M - Mechanical
H - Hydrostatic
D - Flow Diverted
R - Removal of inoperable/non functioning
equipment
I - Installation of equipment
Equipment Used
BELL - Bell nipple
BF - Blind Flange
BM - Bridging material
BOP - Blow Out Preventer
BOPA - Annular
BOPB - Blind rams
BOPCK - Choke and kill lines
BOPHCR - HCR Valve
BOPHL - Hydraulic lines
BOPP - Pipe rams
BOPS - Shear rams
CHK - Choke Manifold
CONN - Connector
CONT - Containment system
CP - Cement pumping Unit
CS - Capping stack
CSG - Ran casing
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CSW - Casing Swedge
CTU - Coil Tubing Unit
DIV - Std rig diverter system
DR - Drilling Rig
EDS - Emergency Disconnect System
FRZ - Freeze plug
GASB - Gas buster
GASL - Gas lift line
GAUG - Pressure Gauge
HNDL - Casing Head Valve Handle
HNGR - Casing Hanger
HYDR - Hydraulic lines
LMRP - Lower Marine Riser Pkg
NAT - Natural Causes
NPL - Nipple
PIPE - Tubing/workstring/drillpipe
PKR - Packer
POLL - Pollution dome
PU - Pumping Unit
RMVL - Removal of inoperable equipment
SEAL - Clamp and Packing
SNU - Snubbing Unit
SSSV - Subsurface Safety Valve
SSV - Surface Safety Valve
TD - Top Drive/Kelly
TIW- TIW Valve
VLV - Valve (eg. BPV, MV, WV, CV, gate
valve)
VT - Venturi Tube
WELL - Wellhead
WIRE - Wireline tools
XTRE - Christmas Tree
How barrier was placed/installed/created?
BULLF - Bullheaded Fluid
BULLP - Bullhead Pill
CV - Closed Valve

INST - Installed equipment
MCV - Manually closed valve
OBS - Insert obstruction into flow
OV - Opened Valve
P&A - Plug & Abandon
PCMP - Pumped completion fluid
PHM - Pumped Heavy Mud
PILL - Lost circulation material spotted
PLACD - Placed over leak source
POF - Placed over flow (no seal)
PSW - Pumped Sea water
RECMT-Remedial Cementing
RV - Valve replaced/repaired
RW - Relief Well
SLCSG-Seal Casing (as with a packer)
SP - Set Plug
STAB - Stab open valve then close
UBLOW - Underground Blowout
WB - Well Bridged
WIN - Water Influx
BM - Bridging Material

Was barrier established
Y - Yes
N – No
SLW - Slowed flow
If no, why?
AB - Abandoned
ATD - Attempt to divert flow
FLOW - Flow through barrier (flow cut)
FTC – Unable to close
LEAK - Leak around barrier
OBS - Barrier failed to close due to obstruction
UTA - Unable to install barrier
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